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PERMANENT VS. TEMPORARY FISCAL
EXPANSION IN A TWO-SECTOR SMALL OPEN
ECONOMY MODEL1
Olivier CARDI2 and Romain RESTOUT3
Abstract
This contribution shows that the duration of a fiscal shock together with sectoral capital
intensity matter in determining the dynamic and steady-state effects in an intertemporal-
optimizing two-sector small open economy model. First, unlike a permanent shock, net
foreign asset position always worsens in the long-run after a transitory fiscal expansion.
Second, steady-state changes in physical capital depend on sectoral capital-labor ratios but
their signs may be reversed compared to the corresponding permanent public policy. Third,
investment and the current account may now adjust non monotonically. Fourth, a temporary
fiscal shock always crowds-out (crowds-in) investment in the long-run whenever the non
traded (traded) sector is more capital intensive.
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1 Introduction
In the last fifteen years, a large literature has investigated the short-term and long-term effects
of government spending shocks within dynamic general equilibrium frameworks. Most of these
papers use a one-sector model with elastic labor supply and analyze both permanent and tem-
porary fiscal policies, in particular Baxter and King [1993] and Karayalc¸in [1999] who assume
perfect competition, Devereux et al. [1996] and Heijdra and Ligthart [2007] who consider mo-
nopolistic competition. Our contribution is to investigate the dynamic and steady-state effects
of fiscal expansions in a two-sector small open economy model by differentiating analytically be-
tween permanent and temporary policies on the one hand and between short-lived and long-lived
transitory spending shocks on the other.
In a one-sector small open economy model with capital adjustment costs and elastic labor
supply, an unanticipated permanent rise in government spending generates a wealth effect which
lowers consumption (and leisure) and raises labor supply, stimulates capital accumulation (due
higher capital marginal productivity) and deteriorates the current account. If the fiscal policy is
solely implemented transitorily, short-term and long-term impacts remain qualitatively similar,
although they are much more moderated (see e. g. Karayalc¸in [1999], Schubert and Turnovsky
[2002]). In our paper, we make the distinction between traded and non traded goods and we
abstract from labor-leisure trade-off for reason of analytical simplicity. The formal study of
transitory changes leads to some striking results since we show that the short-term and more im-
portantly the long-run changes of key economic variables may be reversed compared to permanent
government expenditure shocks. These conclusions stand in sharp contrast to the predictions of
small open country models restricted to a one-sector framework.
We used a two-sector model similar to that developed in Turnovsky and Sen [1995] in which a
traded and a non traded good are produced and consumed in the economy. The introduction of
non tradables allows to capture several important common features of industrialized countries and
to enlarge the effects at work. First, empirical works indicate that the non traded sector accounts
for about 60% of GDP in developed countries.1 Second, data underline that government spending
tends to fall heavily on non traded goods.2 The distinction between traded and non traded goods
is crucial since short-run and long-run behavior of the capital stock and net foreign asset position
depend on relative sectoral capital intensities. In addition, while a rise in government spending
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falling on the traded good influences capital accumulation (and thus GDP) indirectly through
the standard wealth effect, an increase in public expenditure falling on non tradables gives rise to
a real interest rate effect induced by the expected change in the real exchange rate which works
against the former effect.3
Our study departs from Turnovsky and Sen’s [1995] analysis in three respects. First, while
Turnovsky and Sen focus on demand and supply permanent shocks, most of our attention is
devoted to the case of temporary fiscal policies, with the purpose to draw out the striking dif-
ferences with the macroeconomic adjustment after a permanent fiscal expansion. This extension
is crucial since the existence of the zero-root property implies that temporary shocks have per-
manent effects and more importantly a temporary public policy is not a dampening down of the
permanent effect of the corresponding permanent policy.4 Second, we use a dual approach to
deal with consumption decisions which in turn allows for bringing out more clearly the pivotal
factors at stake in determining the macroeconomic dynamics. Third, we calibrate and simulate
the model. Numerical exercises point out the role of the duration of the public policy by com-
puting the impulse functions for different times of policy removal, and by providing quantitative
information about the sizes of the short-term and long-term changes of key economic variables.
To conduct the analysis of temporary shocks, we apply the two-step approach proposed
by Schubert and Turnovsky [2002] to the zero-root property. Their two-step approach has an
attractive use since it allows to express the steady-state values of macroeconomic aggregates as
functions of the marginal utility of wealth and policy parameters and to estimate in a rigorous and
clear way their long-run changes after a temporary fiscal expansion. This paper can be viewed
as a pursuit of the theoretical work initiated by Schubert and Turnovsky [2002] by considering
a two-sector model, and a complementary analysis to the recent continuous-time intertemporal-
optimizing literature investigating the effects of temporary fiscal shocks, in particular Karayalc¸in
[1999] and Heijdra and Ligthart [2007], who restrict their model to a one-sector economy.
Our main results are as follows. First, unlike two-sector models by Obstfeld [1989] and
Turnovsky and Sen [1995] where the economy adjusts monotonically after a permanent fiscal
shock, the temporary nature in the shift of government purchases may give rise to hump- or
U-shaped transient paths for investment and the current account. In particular, investment
may now be crowded-in or crowded-out in the short-run depending on the duration of the public
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policy. Second, different from permanent fiscal policies whenever the rise in government spending
is temporary, the net foreign asset position always worsens in the long-run, irrespective of the
relative capital intensity or the good on which the rise in public spending falls. The third result
is perhaps the most startling. If the transitory rise in government purchases falls on the non
traded good, the steady-state changes in physical capital stock and international assets holding
are reversed compared to those derived after a permanent policy when the traded sector is more
capital intensive. With the reversal capital intensity, the capital stock falls in the long-run instead
of rising. Fourth, while a temporary fiscal expansion always crowds-in investment in the long-
run whenever the traded sector is more capital intensive, the capital stock is decumulated if the
non traded sector features a higher capital-labor ratio, irrespective on the good on which public
spending falls. Fifth, we show formally that a temporary fiscal expansion is not a dampening
down of the permanent effect of the corresponding permanent policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework of a two-sector small
open economy. In section 3, we analyze the equilibrium dynamics and the steady-state of the
model. Sections 4 and 5 compare the short-term and long-term effects of unexpected permanent
and temporary rise in government spending falling on the traded good and the non traded good.
Transitional paths and responses of key macroeconomic variables are computed numerically in
section 6. Section 7 concludes and provides direction for further research.5
2 The Framework
Consider a small open economy that is populated by a constant number of identical households
and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever. The country is small in world goods and
capital markets and faces given world interest rate, r?. There are two types of goods. The
representative firm produces both a traded good that can be exported and a non traded good
which is dedicated to capital accumulation and consumption. The traded good is chosen as
numeraire.
Households
At each instant the representative agent consumes traded goods and non traded goods
denoted by cT and cN . The measure of utility of consumption at time t, c(t), is given by
c(t) = c
(
cT (t), cN (t)
)
with c (.) a positive, increasing, concave and linearly homogeneous aggre-
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gator function. The representative household maximizes a lifetime utility function:∫ ∞
0
u
[
c
(
cT (t), cN (t)
)]
e−δtdt, (1)
where δ is the consumer’s discount rate and marginal utility from real consumption is positive
and decreasing, that is uc > 0, ucc < 0.
Since c (.) is homothetic, the household’s maximization problem can be decomposed into two
stages. At the first stage, the household minimizes the cost, E(t) = cT (t) + p(t)cN (t), for a
given level of subutility, c(t), where p(t) is the relative price of the non traded good (or the real
exchange rate). The assumption that the subutility function c (.) is linear homogeneous implies
that the total expense in consumption goods can be expressed as E(t) = pc (p(t)) c(t). The
ratio E/c gives the unit cost function dual to c (or consumption-based price index), denoted
by pc (p), with p′c > 0, and p′′c < 0. Intra-temporal allocations between non traded goods and
traded goods follow from Sheppard’s Lemma (or the envelope theorem): cN = p′c (p) c and
cT = [pc (p)− pp′c (p)] c.6
Households inelastically supply one unit of labor services (L(t) = 1) for which they receive
the wage w(t). Their non-human wealth, denoted by a(t), measured in terms of the traded good
is equal to the sum of internationally traded bonds holding, n(t), and the value of domestic
capital stock, p(t)K(t), expressed in terms of the traded good. Since these assets are perfect
substitutes, they earn the same rate of return. In the second stage, consumers choose their real
consumption, c, and the rate of accumulation of financial wealth, a˙(t) , to maximize (1) subject
to the flow budget constraint,
a˙(t) = r?a(t) + w(t)− pc (p(t)) c(t)− Z, (2)
and initial condition a(0) = a0. Households’ income consists of interest earnings on traded bonds
holding, r?n(t), rental income r?pK, and labor revenue, w. They pay lump-sum taxes, denoted
by Z, to the government and spend an amount equal to pcc in consumption goods purchases.
Firms
Perfectly competitive firms produce a traded (non traded) good, index by superscript T
(N), using capital, KT (KN ), and labor, LT (LN ), according to a constant returns to scale
production function, Y T = F
(
KT , LT
)
(Y N = H
(
KN , LN
)
), which is assumed to have the
usual neoclassical properties of positive and diminishing marginal products. The production of
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the traded good can be consumed domestically or exported. The non traded good may be used
for capital accumulation and consumption.
For analytical convenience, we assume that the production choices facing the traded and
non traded sectors can be consolidated. The representative firm maximizes the present value of
anticipated future cash flow discounted at the world interest rate:
∫ ∞
0
[
F
(
KT , LT
)
+ pH
(
KN , LN
)− pI − w] e−r?sds, (3)
subject to capital accumulation,7
I = K˙, (4)
together with the labor and capital intersectoral allocation constraints,
LT + LN = 1, KT +KN = K, (5)
and the initial condition for capital stock K(0) = K0.
Government
The final agent in the economy is the government who finances government expenditure by
raising lump-sum taxes Z in accordance with the balanced condition:
gT + p(t)gN = Z. (6)
Public spending consists in purchases of traded goods, gT , and non traded goods, gN .
2.1 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
Denoting by ki ≡ Ki/Li the capital-labor ratio for sector i = T,N , we express the produc-
tion functions in intensive form, that is yT = f
(
kT
) ≡ F (KT , LT ) /LT and yN = h (kN) ≡
H
(
KN , LN
)
/LN .
First-Order Conditions
To obtain the macroeconomic equilibrium, we first derive the optimality conditions for house-
holds and firms and combine these with the inputs allocation constraints and accumulation
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equations. The macroeconomic equilibrium is summarized by the following set of equations:
uc (c) = pc (p)λ, (7a)
fk
(
kT
)
= phk
(
kN
) ≡ rK , (7b)[
f
(
kT
)− kT fk (kT )] = p [h (kN)− kNhk (kN)] ≡ w, (7c)
LTkT + LNkN = K, (7d)
LT + LN = 1, (7e)
λ˙ = λ (δ − r?) , (7f)
p˙ = p
[
r? − hk
(
kN
)]
, (7g)
K˙ = LNh
(
kN
)− p′c (p) c− gN , (7h)
n˙ = r?n(t) + LT f
(
kT
)− (1− αc) pc (p) c− gT , (7i)
and the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞λa(t)e
−r?t = lim
t→∞ p(t)K(t)e
−r?t = lim
t→∞n(t)e
−r?t = 0, (8)
where λ is the co-state variables associated with dynamic equation (2). The last equality of (8)
rules out the possibility for the small country of running up infinite debt or credit and ensures
that the nation remains intertemporally solvent.
The static efficiency condition (7a) requires that along an optimal path the marginal current
utility of real consumption is equal to the marginal utility of wealth in the form of internationally
traded bonds measured in terms of the non traded good, pcλ. Equations (7b) and (7c) require
that in equilibrium, the rate of return on capital and labor equalize in the traded and non traded
sectors. These two conditions will determine in turn the sectoral capital-labor ratios which
together with (7d)-(7e) determinate labor sectoral allocation. Equation (7g) requires that in
equilibrium, the rate of return on capital used in the non traded sector consisting of its marginal
product, hk, must equal the rate of return on traded bonds, i. e. the domestic real interest
rate equals to the world interest rate less the rate of appreciation of the real exchange rate,
p. Equation (7h) described the non traded good market clearing condition according to which
the non traded output may be dedicated both to consumption of households and government
and to capital accumulation. To determine the accumulation equation of foreign bonds (7i), we
differentiated expression n = a−pK with respect to time, then we substituted dynamic equations
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(2), (4) and (7h). Equation (7i) is equal to the current account surplus, which comprises the
trade balance, equal to the value of output less absorption, plus interest payments on outstanding
assets.
Finally, with a constant rate of time preference and an exogenous world interest rate, we
require the time preference rate to be equal to the world interest rate:
δ = r?, (9)
in order to generate an interior solution. This standard assumption made in the literature implies
that the marginal utility of wealth, λ, must remain constant over time and is always at its steady
state level, λ¯. This gives rise to the zero-root property which in turn implies that temporary
perturbations have permanent effects.
Short-Run Static Solutions
The static efficiency condition (7a) can be solved for the short-run macroeconomic equilibrium
which of course must hold at any point of time. We obtain:
c = c
(
λ¯, p
)
, with cλ¯ < 0, cp < 0. (10)
A higher marginal utility of wealth, measured in terms of the traded good, λ¯, encourages savings
and induces the representative agent to reduce the consumption of both goods. Given the
marginal utility of wealth, a real exchange rate appreciation (i. e. a rise in p) raises the marginal
utility of wealth measured in terms of the non traded good through the rise in the consumption
price index and leads to a fall in real consumption.
From static optimality conditions (7b)-(7e), we may solve for sector capital intensities ratios
and for labor
kT = kT (p) , kN = kN (p) , LT = LT (K, p) , LN = LT (K, p) . (11)
where LTp < 0 and L
N
p > 0 and the signs of other partial derivatives are dependent upon
relative sectoral capital intensities. An appreciation in the real exchange rate attracts resources
from the traded to the non traded sector. If kN > kT , labor increases in relative abundance
which lowers the wage-rental ratio, w/rK , and consequently encourages the producers in the two
sectors to substitute labor for capital, causing a decline in the capital-labor ratios, kT and kN .
From the resource constraints, labor moves from the traded sector to the non traded sector and
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consequently raises the non traded output. Finally, a higher aggregate capital stock K induces
a shift of labor in the direction of the more capital intensive sector.8
3 Equilibrium Dynamics and the Steady-State
Equilibrium Dynamics
Inserting short-run static solutions (10) and (11) into (7g) and (7h), linearizing these equa-
tions around the steady-state, we obtain a second-order linearized system which possesses one
negative eigenvalue and one positive eigenvalue with:
µ1 < 0 < r? < µ2. (12)
Since the system features one state variable, K, and one jump variable, p, the equilibrium yields a
unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path, irrespective of the sectoral capital intensity.9 Starting
from an initial aggregate capital stock K(0) = K0, the stable paths for K and p write as follows:
K(t) = K˜ +
(
K0 − K˜
)
eµ1t, p(t) = p˜+ ω12
(
K(t)− K˜
)
, (13)
where ω12 = 0 if k
T > kN and ω12 < 0 if k
N > kT ; we denoted steady-state values with a tilde.
As emphasized by Turnovsky and Sen [1995], a striking feature of the transitional path of the
real exchange rate is its dependency upon the relative capital intensities of sectors T and N .
If the capital intensity of the non traded sector exceeds that of the traded sector, the slope
of the stable path is negatively sloped in the (K, p)-space. Intuitively, a higher demand for the
non traded good causes an immediate real exchange rate appreciation (p jumps upward), labor
shifts in direction of the non traded sector, output of that sector rises and thus aggregate capital
stock starts growing. Since a change in demand leaves unchanged the steady-state value of the
relative price of non tradables, the real exchange rate must depreciate along the stable trajectory
as physical capital accumulates. This expected depreciation raises the consumption-based real
interest rate (rc = r?−αc p˙p) above the time preference rate δ which in turn provides an incentive
to reallocation expenditure towards future.10
Withe the reversal capital intensity (kT > kN ), the dynamics of the relative price degenerate.
For example, a higher demand for non traded appreciates instantaneously the real exchange rate
which leads to a rise in the capital-labor ratios, kT and kN . The relative price must fall to reach
its unchanged long-run equilibrium, i. e. p˙(t)/p(t) < 0. But in the same time, the rental rate on
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capital hk decreases because kN is higher. The no-arbitrage condition (7g) does no longer hold
and the economy moves along an unstable path. Since p must be fixed, equality (9) implies a
flat transitional temporal for real consumption.
Inserting short-run static solutions into (7i), linearizing around the steady-state, substituting
solutions for K(t) and p(t), and invoking the transversality condition (8), we obtain the stable
solution for n(t) consistent with long-run solvency:
n(t)− n˜ = N1
µ1 − r?
(
K(t)− K˜
)
. (14)
where N1/ (µ1 − r?) is unambiguously negative if kT > kN (N1/ (µ1 − r?) = −p˜) but its sign
remains undetermined if kN > kT (N1/ (µ1 − r?) = −p˜
(
1 + 1µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
)
). According to empirical
studies which suggest a negative relationship between the current account, n˙(t), and investment
in capital K˙(t) (see Glick and Rogoff [1995]), we assume that N1/ (µ1 − r?) < 0, irrespective of
the sectoral capital intensity.
Finally, linearization of (2) in the neighborhood of the long-run equilibrium together with
transversality conditions (8), keeping in mind that the wage rate is a function of the real exchange
rate (w = w(p)), enables us to derive the stable solution for the financial wealth:
a(t) = a˜+
M1
µ1 − r? (p(t)− p˜) , (15)
where M1 = −
(
K˜µ2 − σcc˜N
)
< 0 if σc < 1 (as empirical studies suggest). If kT > kN , the
current account offsets exactly the investment flow, ca(t) = −p˜I(t). The savings flow S(t) =
a˙(t) = 0 and thus financial wealth, remains unaffected, i. e. a(t) = a˜. Unlike, if kN > kT , the
current account mirrors both savings and investment behavior, which themselves are determined
by consumption and production decisions. From (15), savings and real exchange rate depreciation
are positively correlated along the stable branch. This is intuitive. Consider, for example, that
the real exchange rate appreciates on impact following a greater demand for non tradable goods.
A higher p(t) lowers the wage rate (wp < 0 if kN > kT ), and raises both total expense in
consumption goods and lump-sum taxes Z (because government spending in non traded measured
in terms of the traded good, i. e. pgN rises) and consequently leads to a negative savings flow.11
Steady-State
The steady-state of the economy is obtained by setting K˙ = p˙ = n˙ = 0 and is defined by the
9
following set of equations:
hk
[
kN (p˜)
]
= r?, (16a)
Y N
(
K˜, p˜
)
− p′c (p˜) c
(
λ¯, p˜
)− gN = 0, (16b)
r?n˜+ Y T
(
K˜, p˜
)
− (1− αc) pc (p˜) c
(
λ¯, p˜
)− gT = 0, (16c)
and the intertemporal solvency condition
(n0 − n˜) = N1
µ1 − r?
(
K0 − K˜
)
. (16d)
We have expressed traded and non traded capital-labor ratios as functions of the real exchange
rate from equations (7b)-(7c) holding at each instant of time. The steady-state equilibrium
defined by these four equations jointly determine p˜, K˜, n˜, λ¯.
Equation (16a) asserts that the rate of change of the real exchange rate is zero when the
marginal physical product of capital in the non traded sector is equal to the exogenous world
interest rate, r?. Because the world interest rate is fixed, demand disturbance taking the form
of government expenditure shocks leaves unchanged the steady-state values of the real exchange
rate, p˜, and the capital-labor ratios, k˜T and k˜N . Equation (16b) restates that the production of
non traded goods must be exactly outweighed by a demand counterpart for a zero investment
and determines K˜ for given λ¯. Equation (16c) implies that the current account must be zero
in the long-run and determines n˜ for given λ¯. Finally, the linearized version of the nation’s
intertemporal budget constraint (16d) implies that the steady-state depends on the initial stocks
K0 and n0 and determines the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth.
One characteristic of the model merits comment. System (16) may be solved for the steady-
state values by applying a two-step procedure. Using equations (16a) to (16c), K˜ and n˜ can be
expressed as functions of marginal utility of wealth (λ¯) government spending on the traded (gT )
and the non traded good (gN ). This yields to the following functions:12
K˜ = K
(
λ¯, gN
)
, n˜ = v
(
λ¯, gT , gN
)
, (17)
with Kλ¯ ≶ 0 and KgN ≷ 0 depending on wether kN ≷ kT , and vλ¯ < 0, vgT > 0, vgN > 0. In the
second step, we insert these functions into the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint (i. e.
eq (16d)), which may be solved for the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth:
λ¯ = λ
(
K0, n0, g
T , gN
)
, λK < 0, λn < 0, λgT > 0, λgN > 0. (18)
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From (18), the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth depends on K0 and n0. Con-
sequently, the steady-state depends on initial conditions and therefore temporary shocks have
permanent effects. When the disturbance lasts solely T periods, we must take into account that
the stocks of capital and traded bonds have been accumulated over the unstable period (0, T ).
This implies new initial conditions for the small open economy once the public policy is removed,
say KT and nT , which in turn influences the new steady state.
4 Permanent vs. Temporary Permanent Increase in Govern-
ment Spending on Traded Good
In this section, we explore the transitional and long-run effects of a rise in government expenditure
on the traded good, gT . We conduct our analysis by studying an unanticipated permanent
increase (denoted by the subscript perm) and an unanticipated temporary rise (denoted by the
subscript temp) in gT .
For the government budget to be balanced at the steady-state, an increase in public spending
must be financed through higher taxes. Therefore, the present value of wealth is reduced. Due
to the zero-root property, the marginal utility of wealth jumps instantaneously upward to its
new steady-state value, λ¯, and remains constant from thereon. Since the long-run relative price
remains unchanged (and therefore the consumption price index), the wealth effect induces agents
to lower their steady-state real consumption level.
An Unanticipated Permanent Rise in gT
Long-run changes in the aggregate capital stock and net foreign position depend on the
relative sectoral capital intensity. More specifically, the long-term variation in the steady-state
value of K plays the key role of clearing the non tradables market. Irrespective of the relative
capital-labor ratio values between sectors, the once-for all increase in λ¯ lowers consumption of
non tradables cN which calls for a long-term fall in output Y N to eliminate the excess supply. If
the non traded (traded) good sector is relatively more capital intensive, the steady-state value
of the capital stock will fall (increase) in order to meet the lower demand for non traded goods.
The long-run current account equilibrium requires a rise (decrease) in the stock of internationally
traded bonds holding since the trade balance worsens (improves).
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The transitional paths are depicted in figure 2(a) in the case kT > kN and in figure 2(b) in
the case kN > kT . If kN > kT , an unanticipated permanent increase in gT raises the demand
for traded goods and leads to an initial depreciation in the real exchange rate, dp(0) < 0.
The positive influence on real consumption originating from the fall in p dampens the wealth
effect. Real consumption decreases on impact, but by less than in the long-run.13 Regarding
the supply-side, the initial drop in the relative price induces a shift of employment from the non
traded sector to the traded sector. The fall of labor reduces in turn the production in the non
traded sector which calls for a decline in investment because the non traded market must clear.
Along the stable path, real consumption and capital stock decrease gradually and the stock of
foreign assets rises. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is less than
one, as empirical evidence suggests, the small country reaches the long-run equilibrium with
greater financial wealth.
If kT > kN , the real exchange rate remains unaffected and the fall in cN releases some re-
sources for investment. Since the capital stock shifts towards the sector which is relatively more
capital intensive, output in the traded sector rises. Along the stable adjustment, aggregate cap-
ital accumulation is exactly matched by a proportional current account deficit triggered by the
rise in gT . Consequently, the steady-state value of the financial wealth remains unaffected.
An Unanticipated Temporary Rise in gT
We turn now to the study of an unanticipated temporary fiscal expansion. We suppose
that government spending rises unexpectedly at time t = 0 from the original level gT0 to level
gT1 , over the period 0 ≤ t < T , and revert back at time T permanently to its initial level
gTT = g
T
2 = g
T
0 . The temporary nature of the fiscal shock requires to consider two periods,
say period 1 (0 ≤ t < T ) during which the small country follows unstable paths and period 2
(t ≥ T ) over which the economy converges towards its new long-run equilibrium. Compared to
a permanent spending shock, we find that the current account may adjust non-monotonically.
More importantly, temporary fiscal shocks always deteriorate the net foreign asset position in the
long-run, irrespective of the sectoral capital intensity (and the good on which the fiscal expansion
falls, say gT or gN ).
Regardless of the sectoral capital intensity, λ¯ jumps upward:
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λgT
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (19)
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Since λgT > 0 denotes the steady-state change of λ¯ for a permanent variation in gT , we see that
the change of λ¯ for a temporary rise in gT is smaller but of the same direction. This is quite
intuitive since the wealth effects induced by the transitory rise in government spending extend
over successively shorter periods as the persistence of the fiscal expansion diminishes.
Because government spending gT returns to its initial level at the time the policy is removed,
the steady-state changes of macroeconomic aggregates are solely driven by the once-for-all jump
of λ¯. Due to the absence of a direct effect (i. e. KgT = 0), the long-run behavior of physical
capital is qualitatively similar to the long-run adjustment after a permanent fiscal expansion.
Unlike, the steady-state change in net foreign asset position is reversed in the case kN > kT
compared to a permanent expansionary budget policy:
dn˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0 <
dn˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ vgT . (20)
The explanation is straightforward. Whenever the policy is transitory, government spending
is restored back to its initial level at time T , net exports improve unambiguously at the new
steady-state which in turn requires a long-run fall in the stock of international assets.
To analyze the initial response of the investment flow, it is convenient to evaluate the lin-
earized version of the market-clearing condition at time t = 0 and differentiate this with respect
to gT :
dI(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Y Np − cNp
) dp(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ σc
c˜N
λ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
, (21)
where
(
Y Np − cNp
)
> 0. The first term on the right-hand side of (21) which features the relative
price effect turns to be null if kT > kN . In the latter case, capital accumulation is solely deter-
mined by the wealth effect which lowers cN as indicated by the second term on the right-hand
side. Consequently, the investment flow turns immediately positive and capital accumulates un-
til time T . If kN > kT , the wealth effect works against the relative price effect. Because the
real exchange rate depreciates on impact, this adjustment has a depressive effect on Y N and
influences positively cN . It can be shown analytically that the latter effect more than outweighs
the wealth effect, and physical capital monotonically decreases over the unstable period 1.
The initial current account response relies upon the strength of a relative price effect falling
now on tradables, the standard wealth effect and a direct effect due to temporarily higher gov-
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ernment spending:
dca(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Y Tp − cTp
) dp(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ σc
c˜T
λ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− 1. (22)
where
(
Y Tp − cTp
)
< 0 under the mild assumption that cTp is positive.
14 If kN > kT , the current
account is initially affected by three effects. The relative price effect and the wealth effect,
captured respectively by the first and the second term on the right-hand side of (22), improve
the trade balance by stimulating the production of the traded sector Y T and by lowering the
consumption of tradables cT . The strength of these two effects depend on the duration of the
fiscal policy. Unlike, the third term on the right-hand side of (22) reflects the direct effect
which worsens the net exports through the rise in public demand for the traded good. If the
expansionary budget policy is implemented over a short period, say T < Tˆ , the direct effect
predominates and the small country decumulates traded bonds. Instead, if the spending shock
is long-living, the relative price effect and the wealth effect more than outweigh the direct effect
since the initial real exchange rate depreciation is more pronounced and the marginal utility of
wealth rises markedly. If kT > kN , the current account deteriorates initially without ambiguity
because the relative price effect is no longer effective.
The dynamic adjustment in the case kT > kN is illustrated in the left panel of figure 2(a). The
small country starts from an initial equilibrium F0 and converges towards the long-run equilib-
rium Ftemp. Over period 1 during which the fiscal expansion is effective, the adjustment involves
a positive investment and a current account deficit. The solution for net foreign assets displays
an explosive component due to the smoothing behavior of households. While t approaches T ,
the economy decumulates traded bonds at an increasing rate. When gT is restored to its initial
level, the system moves along a sustainable path, shown as line N ′N ′.
Figures 2(b) trace out the transitional paths of the capital stock and net foreign asset position
when kN > kT . The striking difference compared to the dynamic adjustment which arises after
a permanent fiscal expansion is that the stock of foreign assets may exhibit a non-monotonic
pattern if the public policy is implemented over a sufficiently long period, say T > Tˆ (see the
right panel of figure 2(b)). Compared to a permanent fiscal shock, the transitional path followed
by the current account is now influenced by a smoothing effect reflected by the first term on the
14
dgT dgN
Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary
kT > kN kN > kT kT > kN kN > kT kT > kN kN > kT kT > kN kN > kT
Long-Term Effects
K + - + - - + + -
n - + - - + - - -
a 0 + - - 0 - - -
c - - - - - - - -
Short-Term Effects
I(0) + - + - - + - -/+
ca(0) - + - -/+ + - + -
S(0) 0 + 0 -/+ 0 - 0 -/+
c(0) - - - - - - - -
p(0) 0 - 0 - 0 + 0 +
Figure 1: Qualitative Effects of Permanent and Temporary Fiscal Policy
right-hand side besides the standard influence of capital accumulation:
ca(t) = n˙(t) = −e−r?(T −t)dgT + N1
µ1 − r? K˙(t) R 0. (23)
The explosive component reflects the fact that households understood perfectly that the spending
shock is solely transitory such that they choose to lower their real consumption but by less than
the fall of their disposable income. This behavior worsens the current account. The second
term represents the positive influence on the current account induced by the decumulation in the
physical capital stock. The longer-lasting the fiscal expansion, the more likely a current account
improvement over a first phase followed by a current account deficit over a second phase due to
the smoothing effect. The external asset position worsens until the fiscal policy is removed at
time T . Over the stable period, i. e. from T onwards, physical capital stock keeps on falling and
the current account improves (along the line N ′N ′) until the small country reaches the long-run
equilibrium at point Ftemp in figure 2(b).
5 Permanent vs. Temporary Increase in Government Spending
on the Non Traded Good
Until now, we have analyzed the effects of a fiscal expansion falling on gT . Based on empirical
evidence which points out that government expenditure tend to fall heavily on non traded goods,
we analyze the effects of a temporary increase in gN . Our main findings are as follows. First, dif-
ferent from a temporary rise in gT , investment adjustment may display a non-monotonic pattern
over (0, T ). Second, if the shock is not too long-living, investment is crowded-out by the transi-
tory fiscal shock in the short-term, irrespective of the relative sectoral capital intensity. Third,
15
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Figure 2: Fiscal Expansion in the (K,n)-space
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we show formally that a permanent fiscal expansion is not an infinitely long-lived expansionary
budget policy.
An Unanticipated Permanent Increase in gN
Compared to a permanent increase in gT , steady-state changes in the aggregate capital stock
and the internationally traded bonds holding are reversed whenever public spending falls on gN .
If the non traded (traded) sector is relatively more capital intensive, K˜ will increase (decrease) in
order to meet the higher demand for non traded goods. Because the capital stock shifts towards
the more capital intensive sector, output of the traded sector unambiguously falls at the new
steady-state state in either case. If kN > kT (kT > kN ), the trade balance improves (worsens) in
the long-run. In the steady-state equilibrium, the current account must zero such that the small
country holds a lower (higher) stock of internationally traded bonds.
The transitional path in the case kN > kT is depicted in figure 2(c). The economy starts from
an initial steady-state at point F0. An unanticipated permanent rise in government spending on
the non traded good raises the demand for non traded goods and leads to an initial appreciation
in the real exchange rate. The initial rise in the relative price p to the level p(0)perm attracts
resources in the non traded sector. Beside this relative price effect, the wealth effect exerts a
negative influence on cN . Because the strength of these two effects are sufficiently strong for
more than outweighing the direct effect reflected by the rise in gN , investment is crowded-in by
the permanent fiscal expansion. While the small country converges towards its new long-run
equilibrium at Fperm, the current account deteriorates monotonically.
Assuming that kT > kN , the direct effect predominates and leads to a capital decumulation.
As illustrated in the right panel of figure 2(a), the economy moves along the stable branch labelled
NN from point F0 to point Fperm. The aggregate capital stock declines and agents accumulate
internationally traded bonds.
An Unanticipated Temporary Increase in gN
We explore now the effects of an unexpected temporary expansionary budget policy falling on
gN . In the case kT > kN , the marginal utility of wealth rises initially but its jumps is moderated
compared to a permanent fiscal expansion:
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λgN
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (24)
Interestingly, the steady-state variations of K˜ and n˜ are reversed compared to an unanticipated
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rise in gN . An important finding is that the capital stock reaches a higher level at the new long-
term equilibrium; more specifically, the magnitude of the economic expansion depends upon the
duration of the fiscal shock:
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+KgN < 0 <
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
. (25)
While a permanent fiscal expansion depresses investment, a rise in government spending imple-
mented solely temporarily has a positive impact on capital accumulation. Its magnitude rises
with the length of implementation for two reasons: the wealth effect turns out to be larger and
the economic policy is expected to be removed at some date (although in the distant future)
such that the direct effect reflected by KgN vanishes.
We investigate now the impact effects, starting first by investment behavior:
dI(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= σc
c˜N
λ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− 1 < 0. (26)
The striking difference compared to a permanent fiscal expansion on gN is that the initial upward
jump in λ¯ is now dampened and consequently the induced fall in cN is moderated. The negative
investment flow is thus much more pronounced in absolute terms and the capital stock decreases
along an unstable path over the entire period 1 as it is illustrated in the right panel of figure
2(a). Keeping in mind that the marginal utility of wealth remains constant after its once-for-all
change at time t = 0+, once the government policy is removed, investment jumps upward for the
market-clearing condition to hold, that is dI (T +) = −dgN (T ) > 0. Over the stable period 2,
capital accumulates until the small country reaches its long-run equilibrium at point Ftemp.
The current account dynamics are a little more complex compared to a permanent fiscal
expansion since a smoothing effect is now at work. Transitional dynamics can be disentangled
in two phases by noting that there exists a date t = t´ (with ca
(
t´
)
= 0) such that the stock of
foreign assets overshoots along the stable trajectory, as it is depicted in the right panel of figure
2(a). The net foreign asset position improves initially while the negative investment flow more
than outweighs the smoothing effect:
dca(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= p˜ (1− αc)
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0 (27)
At time t´, these two effects cancel each other. Subsequently, the current account deteriorates
because the smoothing behavior predominates, such that ca(t) ≤ 0 over t ≥ t´. Once the public
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policy has been removed, the positive investment flow deteriorates the current account. At the
new steady-state, the capital stock is permanently increased and the net foreign asset position
of the small country is definitively worsened.
In the case kN > kT , transitional dynamics turn out to be more interesting in economic terms
because a real interest rate is now at work. Whenever the non traded sector features a higher
capital-labor ratio, the real exchange rate dynamics do no longer degenerate. The once-for-all
jump in λ¯ is now much more moderated thanks to a real interest rate effect :
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λgN
(1− e−µ2T )− µ2
(
e−r?T − e−µ2T )[
µ2 + r
?
µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
 > 0, (28)
From expression (28), a transitory fiscal expansion exerts on λ¯ two conflictory influences. The
(positive) first term on the right-hand side of (28) indicates that the change in λ¯ equals the change
after a permanent rise in gN , λgN , scaled-down by the term 0 <
(
1− e−µ2T ) < 1. In addition, a
change in government spending falling on gN gives rise to a real interest rate effect reflected by the
(negative) second term. Following an increase in gN , the real exchange rate appreciates initially
which in turns magnifies the standard wealth effect reducing real consumption. This behavior
softens the decumulation of foreign bonds (as reflected by e−r?T ) but plays negatively upon
investment (as reflected by −e−µ2T ). Since the former influence prevails over the latter, the real
interest rate effect dampens the standard wealth effect. It can be shown that λ¯ unambiguously
jumps upwards. We shall discuss long-run changes at the end of this section.
The initial investment flow is the result of three conflictory forces and its sign is not clear-cut:
dI(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Y Np − cNp
) dp(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ σc
c˜N
λ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− 1, (29)
Beside the relative price effect (first term on the right-hand side of (29)) and the wealth effect (sec-
ond term) that influences positively capital accumulation, the direct effect (third term) reflects
the crowding-out of investment expenditure in response to government spending. Compared to
a permanent fiscal expansion, a rise in gN may eventually crowd-out capital accumulation if the
policy is implemented over a short period, say T < T´ . By contrast, if the spending shock is
persistent, investment rises initially. Nevertheless, there exists a critical value of time, t = t˜ > 0,
such that the stock of physical capital reaches a turning point during its transitional path, i. e.
I
(
t˜
)
= 0, and investment will be crowded-out thereafter.
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The initial current account response can be formally described as follows:
dca(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
N1
µ1 − r?
dI(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
− p˜
(
e−r
?T − e−µ2T
)
< 0. (30)
The first term on the right-hand side of (30) indicates that the initial current account offsets
investment, the latter being moderated compared to a permanent fiscal expansion by a scaled-
down factor 0 <
(
1− e−r?T ) < 1. In words, if the expansionary budget policy is long-lived,
capital accumulation takes place which in turn deteriorates the foreign asset position. The second
term on the right-hand side of (30) (−p˜e−r?T < 0) represents the standard smoothing effect
which deteriorates the net foreign asset position due to a negative savings flow. The third term
(p˜e−µ2T > 0) reflects the real interest effect which plays negatively on capital accumulation and
therefore influences positively the current account. It can be shown analytically that the current
account unambiguously worsens at the time the public policy is implemented and international
assets are decumulated monotonically over entire period 1.
Once the public policy is permanently removed at time T , the small country moves along a
stable branch denoted by FT Ftemp displayed in figure 2(c). Whatever the duration of the fiscal
shock, the investment flow turns positive for the non traded market clearing condition to hold
while gN is restored to its initial level. Consequently, the net foreign asset position keeps on
worsening until the small country reaches the long-run equilibrium Ftemp. Henceforth, we may
infer that the stock of financial wealth held by households is permanently lowered.
A Permanent Fiscal Policy is not an Infinitely-Lived Transitory Fiscal Policy
Long-term effects of an unanticipated temporary fiscal expansion merits some comments.
When the model features the zero-root property, transitory expansionary budget policies have
permanent effects. More importantly, long-run changes after government spending shocks may
be reversed compared to a permanent public policy. In particular, making use of (17), we find
that an unanticipated temporary fiscal expansion always worsens the net foreign asset position
in the long-run:
dn˜
dgj
∣∣∣∣
perm
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgj
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ vgj ≷ 0,
dn˜
dgj
∣∣∣∣
temp
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgj
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, j = T,N, (31)
with vgj > 0. From (31), after a permanent fiscal expansion, steady-state change in the stock of
international assets is the sum of two influences: a wealth effect induced by the change in λ¯ and
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a direct effect driven by permanently raised government spending. Differently, after a temporary
fiscal expansion, the direct effect is ineffective since gj is perfectly expected to revert back to its
initial level. Because λ¯ jumps upward in all cases, net exports improve which requires a fall in
the stock of internationally traded bonds for the current account to be balanced in the long-run.
The longer-lasting the fiscal expansion, the stronger the wealth effect and the greater the fall in
n˜.
We turn to the long-run change in the capital stock after a fiscal expansion falling on gN ,
considering the most interesting case, i. e. kN > kT . This discussion allows to state formally
that a permanent fiscal expansion is not an infinitely-lived transitory expansionary policy. To
provide a formal proof, we differentiate function (17) and we let the parameter T tend to infinity
which implies:
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣T →∞
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣T →∞
temp
= Kλ¯λgN < 0. (32)
From (32), the capital stock unambiguously falls in the long-run following an infinitely-lived tran-
sitory expansionary policy while after an unanticipated permanent rise in gN , K˜ unambiguously
rises:
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+KgN = Kλ¯λgN︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+KgN︸︷︷︸
(+)
> 0. (33)
This result can be explained in a simple way. After an infinitely-lived transitory shock, the
wealth effect extends over an infinite period like after a permanent shock. Whenever a fiscal
expansion falling on gN is implemented transitorily, government spending returns at time T
to its original level, although in a very distant future. This discrete fall in gN implies a lower
demand of non tradables which in turn requires a decrease in supply and thus in the capital
stock. While after a permanent fiscal expansion, the direct effect crowds-in investment in the
long-run, its absence always crowds-out capital accumulation whenever government purchases
are raised solely temporarily. The longer-lasting the fiscal expansion, the stronger the wealth
effect and the larger the fall in K˜.
6 The Quantitative Role of Duration of Fiscal Expansion
The findings of the previous section point out the importance of differentiating between perma-
nent and temporary fiscal shocks on the one hand, and long-lived and short-lived expansionary
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budget policies on the other. In this section, we compare quantitatively the effects of perma-
nent and temporary shifts in government expenditure. To conduct the numerical simulations we
assume that the instantaneous utility function is of the CRRA form:
u (c) =
1
1− 1σc
c1−
1
σc . (34)
The traded and the non traded good are aggregated by the means of a CES function:
c
(
cT , cN
)
=
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
cT
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (cN)φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (35)
with ϕ the weight attached to the traded good in the overall consumption bundle (0 < ϕ < 1) and
φ the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (φ > 0). The production functions are supposed to
take a Cobb-Douglas form:
f
(
kT
)
=
(
kT
)θ
, 0 < θ < 1, h
(
kN
)
=
(
kN
)β
, 0 < β < 1, (36)
where the parameters θ and β indicate the degree of capital intensity in the traded and non
traded sector.
The values of parameters are set to be consistent with standard estimates. The intertemporal
elasticity of substitution denoted by σc is set to 0.7, a value falling in the range 0.5 and 1 of
empirical estimates (see e. g. Cashin and McDermott [2003]).15 The intratemporal elasticity of
substitution is set to 2 implying that traded and non traded goods are substitutes in consumption
(i. e. cTp > 0). Following Stockman and Tesar [1995], the parameter ϕ is assigned such that
the share of non tradables in total expenditure denoted by αc falls in the range 40-60%. At
this end, ϕ is set to 0.5. Regarding the production-side, if the traded sector is more capital
intensive (i. e. kT > kN ), parameters θ and β take the values 0.45 and 0.35. With the reversal
capital intensity, we impose that θ = 0.35 and β = 0.45. These values are close to sectoral
labor intensities estimated by Kakkar [2003].16 The world interest rate is chosen to be 0.06.
The benchmark values for gT and gN are set to get consistent government expenditure-GDP
ratios (gT /Y T , gN/Y N and g/Y ).17 Tables 5(a) and 5(b) report the steady-state values of key
economic variables.18
We now investigate the effects of permanent and temporary shifts in government purchases
which last for T years in the latter case. Fiscal expansions are calibrated in order to simulate an
increase in the ratio government spending-GDP (g/Y ) by 2 percentage points of GDP. Table 6
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displays the short- and long-term responses of key economic variables following permanent and
temporary increase in gT and gN ; we consider a two-year, five-year and a ten-year fiscal shock.
First, as we underlined it previously, fiscal shocks drive down the stock of international assets
in the long-run in all cases. This finding is supported by recent empirical evidence provided by
Bussie`re et al. [2007] who find that for the G-7 countries, an increase in government budget deficit
by 1 percentage point of GDP will on average worsen the current account by 0.14 percentage
points of GDP. Second, our quantitative analysis shows that, irrespective of capital intensities
and the good on which public spending falls, temporary government expenditure shifts have
greater long-term impacts on the net foreign asset position. The explanation is straightforward.
While after an unexpected permanent fiscal shock, the steady-state change in internationally
traded bonds holding is driven by a direct effect (induced by permanently raised government
expenditure) working against a wealth effect, after a temporary fiscal shock the latter effect
solely is at stake. Because the rise in the marginal utility of wealth improves net exports, the
net foreign asset position must worsen markedly for the current account equilibrium to hold in
the long-run.19 Our third result relates to capital accumulation. Empirical studies, in particular
Perotti [2005] and Bussie`re et al. [2007] find a significant negative effect of fiscal shocks on
investment in OECD countries. Responses of investment displayed in Table 6 highlights this
empirical evidence. Compared to a permanent expansionary budget policy, it is striking to state
that a temporary fiscal shock crowds-out investment in the short-run in most cases, in particular
when the government spending shock falls on gN .
Figures 3 trace out the computed transitional paths for investment, savings and current
account after an unanticipated temporary rise in gT . Our two main results are as follows.
Irrespective of the sectoral capital intensities, the shorter-living the fiscal expansion, the stronger
the smoothing effect and the larger the initial current account deficit. This result is in line with
empirical evidence provided by Freund [2005] and supports the view that current account deficits
are mostly demand driven. In the case kT > kN , the temporary nature of the fiscal policy restores
the transitional dynamics for savings due to the smoothing behavior which mostly explains the
current deficit. In the case kN > kT , while after a permanent rise in gT , the small country
reaches its new long-run equilibrium with a higher stock of foreign assets, a temporary fiscal
policy worsens the net foreign asset position both in the short- and the long-run.20 Regarding
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Figure 3: Transitional Paths for Unexpected Permanent and Temporary Increase in gT
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Figure 4: Transitional Paths for Unexpected Permanent and Temporary Increase in gN
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investment behavior, its initial response raises with the length of the lead time T . If the fiscal
shock is long-living, consumption of non tradables falls markedly because of the wealth effect
which in turn leads to a positive or a negative investment flow depending on wether kT ≷ kN .
The computed transitional paths following an unanticipated temporary rise in gN are depicted
in figures 4. As shown in section 5 in the case kN > kT , investment may now exhibit a non-
monotonic pattern during the period over which the public policy is implemented (see figures
4(b)). If the fiscal expansion is short-living, investment is crowded-out on impact since the
direct effect more than outweighs the relative price effect driven by the initial real exchange rate
appreciation coupled to the standard wealth effect. By contrast, if the fiscal policy is a ten-year
shock, capital accumulates over five years; then, along the trajectory, investment flow turns
negative until the policy is removed at time T = 10. The transitional dynamics for investment
over unstable period 1 can be split into two phases. Over a first phase, the trajectory displays a
convex pattern as the term (of its solution) associated to the stable eigenvalue (µ1) predominates.
Over a second phase, the term associated to the unstable root predominates such that investment
turns negative. The capital stock moves along a decreasing trajectory with a slope becoming
steeper in absolute terms as time t approaches the removal date, say T = 10. Irrespective of the
sectoral capital intensity, investment is crowded-in when the public spending is restored back to
its initial level. In the case kN > kT , decumulation of the capital stock is slightly softened by
accumulation after time T such that K˜ unambiguously falls in the long-run while a permanent
expansionary budget policy crowds-in capital accumulation.
7 Conclusion
The extension of the two-sector model by Turnovsky and Sen [1995] to the study of temporary
fiscal expansions turns out to be particularly interesting because we show formally that a transi-
tory rise in government expenditure may induce opposite responses of macroeconomic aggregates
compared to a permanent policy both in the short-run and in the long-run. More specifically, the
existence of the zero-root property implies that a temporary public policy is not a dampening
down of the permanent effect of the corresponding permanent policy. In words, a permanent
fiscal expansion is not an infinitely-lived temporary expansionary budget policy, the latter having
permanent effects.
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What are the main economic policy lessons drawn from the a two-sector small open economy
model inhabiting by infinitely-living agents, having time separable preferences and facing perfect
international capital markets? The zero-root property requires to differentiate carefully between
permanent an temporary fiscal policies on the one hand and between short-lived and long-lived
transitory fiscal shocks on the other. One important finding is that, irrespective of the good on
which the rise in government spending falls and irrespective of the duration of the public policy,
whenever the non traded sector features a higher capital-labor ratio, the stock of physical capital
and international assets holding are permanently reduced in the long-run. This result must signal
to decisions-makers that an expansionary budget policy may eventually crowd-in investment in
the short-run (under some conditions), but this expansionary effect will last a short period and
investment will be crowded-out in the long-run. By contrast, irrespective of the good on which
the rise in government spending falls, when the traded sector is relatively more capital intensive,
a temporary rise in public expenditure always raises the capital stock in the long-run although
the net foreign asset asset position worsens in all cases. To summarize, short-term and and
long-term effects after a temporary rise in government spending may be reversed compared to
those obtained after a permanent public policy.
Our contribution could be usefully extended by introducing a labor-leisure trade-off. With
elastic labor, the effects of both permanent and temporary shocks in public consumption will
change substantially. In particular, the capital stock will be positively correlated with the
marginal utility of wealth if the elasticity of labor supply is not too small. This implies that both
permanent and temporary fiscal shocks will crowd-in investment in the long-run, irrespective of
the good on which government spending falls and the duration of the expansionary budget policy.
This extension comes at a price since the transitional paths must be computed numerically.
Notes
1According to Cashin and McDermott [2003], the non traded share in GDP represents more than 60% of GDP
for a group of OECD countries.
2Using disaggregated data from 30 countries Morshed an Turnovsky [2004] estimate that non traded government
spending represent at least 83 % of total public spending.
3Cashin and McDermott [2003] provide some empirical evidence regarding the importance of the intratemporal
substitution of consumption between traded and non traded goods on private savings.
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4In a small open economy model that consists of a large number of identical and infinitely living agents with
perfect foresight, the equality between the constant domestic rate of time preference and the exogenous world
interest rate must be imposed to insure a finite interior steady-state value for the marginal utility of wealth which
gives rise to the zero-root property.
5Most key results of the paper can be retrieved in a Technical Appendix available from authors on request.
6The unit cost dual function, pc (.), is defined as the minimum total expense in consumption goods, E, such
that c = c
(
cT (t), cN (t)
)
= 1, for a given level of real exchange rate, p. The minimized unit cost function depends
on the real exchange rate and is expressed in terms of the traded good. The consumption price index has the
following properties: pc (p) > 0, p
′
c (p) > 0, p
′′
c (p) < 0.
7We abstract from capital depreciation for simplicity.
8Substituting (11) into the production functions, we can solve for the traded and the non traded output:
Y T = Y T (K, p) and Y N = Y N (K, p) with Y Tp < 0 and Y
N
p > 0.
9General solutions for K and p are given by:
K(t)− K˜ = B1eµ1t +B2eµ2t, p(t)− p˜ = ω12B1eµ1t + ω22B2eµ2t, (37)
where B1 and B2 are constants to be determined and ω
i
2 is the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue µi (with
i = 1, 2). We normalized the eigenvector ωi1 to unity.
10Dynamic equation for real consumption is obtained by differentiating (7a) with respect to time and making
use of (7f):
c˙ = σcc
(
r? − αc p˙
p
− δ
)
. (38)
11A transitorily higher relative price of non tradables calls for a real exchange rate depreciation which raises
the consumption-based real interest rate and thus lowers real consumption. If the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is low, say less than one as empirical evidence suggest, this effect is more than offset by the other
effects at work described in the text.
12The steady-state value of the real exchange rate remains constrained by the equality between the capital
marginal product in the non traded sector and the fixed world interest rate such that p˜ does not depend on λ¯ or
public policy parameters.
13This can be seen more formally by differentiating the short-run static solution for consumption with respect
to gT :
dc˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
<
dc(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ cp
dp(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (39)
14The elasticity of cT with respect to p is given by
cTp p
cT
= αc (φ− σc). Its sign is ambiguous and relies upon the
sizes of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution φ between tradables and non tradables and the intertemporal
elasticity substitution σc. The empirical literature finds that a φ close to 1.5-2 and σc less than one. Consequently,
a positive elasticity is in line with empirical estimates.
15Benchmark values for the intertemporal and the intratemporal elasticities of substitution come from estimates
of Cashin and McDermott [2003].
16Kakkar [2003] provides labor sectoral intensities for a panel of fourteen OECD countries. His estimates suggest
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that seven countries possess a traded sector which is more capital intensive with θ ∈ [0.39; 0.54] and β ∈ [0.34; 0.51].
In the case kT > kN , capital intensities are in average equal to: θˆ = 0.46 and βˆ = 0.39. If the non traded sector is
more capital intensive, the parameters θ and β belong to the respective range [0.28; 0.48] and [0.36; 0.59]; in this
case, average values are: θˆ = 0.40 and βˆ = 0.47.
17We denoted by g and Y the total public expenditure and the overall GDP which are defined as follows:
g = gT + pgN and Y = Y T + pY N .
18Transitional paths in figures 3-4 and values in table 6 for investment are expressed in terms of the traded good
such that all variables are measured in terms of the numeraire.
19In particular, we can note that the fall in the stock of international assets is large given the shortness in the
length of the rise in g/Y ; for example, in the case kT > kN , n˜ falls by more 16% after two years following a
transitory increase in gT .
20In section 4, we show that the initial response of the current account is not clear-cut and depends on the
length of the lead time T . Figures 3(a) show that the current account deteriorates on impact, even if the fiscal
expansion is strongly persistent. Even if we considered a long-lived fiscal shock, say a ten-year shock, the initial
current account over GDP enters in deficit (-0.64%). Our simulations indicate that the fiscal shock must last at
least 18.6 years to give rise to a current account surplus. In this case, despite the fact that the small country
accumulates traded bonds initially, the external position turns negative just after four months.
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8 Tables
Steady-State Values
k
T > kN kN > kT
k˜T 22.91 25.66
k˜N 15.08 39.00
p˜ 1.34 0.71
K˜ 18.21 32.71
n˜ 0.92 -10.40
λ¯ 0.24 0.38
c˜ 2.47 2.25
αc 0.43 0.59
(a) Steady-State
Values
Model Data
k
T > kN kN > kT
gT /Y T 0.04 0.05 0.04
gN/Y N 0.42 0.44 0.41
gN/g 0.93 0.92 0.93
g/Y 0.25 0.27 0.26
Y N/Y 0.56 0.57 0.59
(b) Steady-State Ratios
Figure 5: Long-Run Levels of Key Economic Variables
dgT dgN
kT > kN kT > kN
Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary
T = 2 T = 5 T = 10 T = 2 T = 5 T = 10
Long-Term
dK˜ 0.41 0.05 0.11 0.18 -0.52 0.04 0.10 0.18
dn˜ -10.80 -16.94 -38.82 -67.59 13.85 -16.21 -37.15 -64.68
da˜ 0.00 -1.45 -3.33 -5.79 0.00 -1.39 -3.18 -5.54
Short-Term
dI(0)/Y˜0 0.89 0.10 0.23 0.40 -1.14 -1.89 -1.76 -1.60
dca(0)/Y˜0 -0.89 -1.94 -1.77 -1.54 1.14 0.13 0.29 0.51
dS(0)/Y˜0 0.00 -1.84 -1.54 -1.14 0.00 -1.76 -1.47 -1.09
kN > kT kN > kT
Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary
T = 2 T = 5 T = 10 T = 2 T = 5 T = 10
Long-Term
dK˜ -0.43 -0.05 -0.11 -0.20 0.32 -0.05 -0.12 -0.21
dn˜ 0.95 -1.11 -2.53 -4.41 -0.71 -1.15 -2.65 -4.63
da˜ 0.11 -0.72 -1.64 -2.86 -0.08 -0.75 -1.72 -3.01
Short-Term
dI(0)/Y˜0 -0.78 -0.09 -0.20 -0.35 0.58 -0.28 0.70 1.16
dca(0)/Y˜0 0.96 -1.63 -1.21 -0.65 -0.71 -1.71 -2.46 -2.33
dS(0)/Y˜0 0.18 -1.72 -1.41 -1.00 -0.13 -1.99 -1.76 -1.37
Figure 6: Quantitative Effects of Permanent and Temporary Fiscal Policy
29
References
Baxter, Marianne and Robert G. King (1993) Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium. American
Economic Review, 83(3), 315-334.
Bussie`re, Mathieu, Marcel Fratzscher and Gernot Mu¨ller (2007) Productivity Shocks, Budget
Deficits and the Current Account. Working Paper. Goethe University Frankfurt.
Cashin, Paul and John C. McDermott (2003) Intertemporal Substituion and Terms-of-Trade
Shocks. Review of International Economics, vol. 11 (4), 604-618.
Devereux, Michael B., Allen Head and Beverly J. Lapham (1996) Monopolistic Competition,
Increasing Returns, and the Effects of Government Spending. Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, 28(2), 233-254.
Freund, Caroline (2005) Current Account Adjustment in Industrial Countries. Journal of
International Money and Finance 24, 1278-1298.
Glick, and Rogoff (1995) Global Versus Country-Specific Productivity Shocks and the Current
Account. Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 159-192.
Heijdra, Ben J., and Jenny E. Ligthart (2007) Fiscal Policy, Monopolistic Competition, and
Finite Lives. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31(1), 325-359.
Kakkar, Vikas (2003) The Relative Price of Nontraded Goods and Sectoral Total Factor
Productivity: an Empirical Investigation. Review of Economics and Statistics 85(2), 444-
452.
Karayalc¸in, Cem (1999) Temporary and Permanent Government Spending in a Small Open
Economy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 43, 125-141.
Morshed Mahbub A. K. M., and Stefen J. Turnovsky (2004) Sectoral Adjustment Costs and
Real Exchange Rate Dynamics in a Two-Sector Dependent Economy. Journal of International
Economics 63, 147-177.
Obstfeld, Maurice (1989) Fiscal Deficits and Relative Prices in a Growing World Economy.
Journal of Monetary Economics 23, 461-484.
30
Perotti, Roberto (2005) Estimating the Effects of the Fiscal Policy in OECD Countries.
CEPR Discussion Paper 4842.
Schubert, Stefan F., and Stephen J. Turnovsky (2002) The Dynamics of Temporary Policies
in a Small Open Economy. Review of International Economics 10(4), 604-622.
Stockman Alan C. and Linda L. Tesar (1995) Tastes and Technology in a Two-Country Model
of the Business Cycle: Explaining International Comovements. American Economic Review
85(1), 168-185.
Turnovsky, Stephen J. and Partha Sen (1995) Investment in a Two-Sector Dependent Econ-
omy. Journal of the Japenese and International Economies 9, 29-55.
31
Mathematical Appendix
A Short-Run Static Solutions
A.1 Short-Run Static Solutions for Consumption-Side
In this section, we compute short-run static solutions for real consumption and labor supply by
making use of the first-order condition (7a):
c = c
(
λ¯, p
)
, (40)
with
cλ¯ =
∂c
∂λ¯
= −σc c
λ¯
< 0, (41a)
cp =
∂c
∂p
= −αcσc c
p
< 0, (41b)
where σc = −uc/uccc > 0 corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Denoting by φ the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the tradable and the non
tradable good, we can solve for cT and cN :
cT = cT
(
λ¯, p
)
, cN = cN
(
λ¯, p
)
, (42)
with
cTλ¯ = −σc
cT
λ¯
< 0, cTp = αc
cT
p
(φ− σc) ≶ 0, (43a)
cNλ¯ = −σc
cN
λ¯
< 0, cNp = −
cN
p
[(1− αc)φ+ αcσc] < 0. (43b)
A.2 Short-Run Static Solutions for Production-Side
Capital-Labor Ratios
From static optimality conditions (7b) and (7c), we may express sector capital-labor ratios
as functions of the real exchange rate:
kT = kT (p) , kN = kN (p) , (44)
with
kTp =
∂kT
∂p
=
h
fkk (kN − kT ) , (45a)
kNp =
∂kN
∂p
=
f
p2hkk (kN − kT ) . (45b)
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We summarize our results graphically. In figure 7, we have represented the locus of points
such that fk = phk, denoted by PmKT = PmKN and the locus of points such that f
(
kT
) −
kT fk
(
kT
)
= p
[
h
(
kN
)− kNhk (kN)], denoted by PmLT = PmLN . In words, along these
two curves, the equality of marginal products for capital and labor are insured. The locus
PmKT = PmKN has a slope given by:
dkN
dkT
∣∣∣∣
PmKT=PmKN
=
fkk
phkk
> 0, (46)
and the locus PmLT = PmLN has a slope given by:
dkN
dkT
∣∣∣∣
PmLT=PmLN
=
kT fkk
pkNhkk
> 0. (47)
Inspecting analytical expressions (46) and (47), we see that the locus PmKT = PmKN is more
or less steeper than the locus PmLT = PmLN depending on wether kN ≷ kT . In figure 7, we
emphasize the impact of a real exchange rate appreciation on the sectoral capital-labor ratios. A
rise in the relative price of non-tradable goods shifts the locus PmKT = PmKN to the left and
the locus PmLT = PmLN to the right. In the left panel of figure 7, the equality of marginal
products between the two sectors are insured for lower capital-labor ratios and in the right panel,
for higher capital-labor ratios.
Using the fact that w ≡ f (kT )− kT fk (kT ) and rK ≡ fk (kT ) and substituting kT = kT (p),
we can determine the change in the wage rate-rental rate ratio induced by a variation in the real
exchange rate:
d
(
w/rK
)
dp
= −fkkk
T
p
(
rKkT + w
)
(rK)2
≶ 0 depending on wether kN ≷ kT . (48)
A rise in the relative price of non traded goods causes a shifting of capital stock and labor from
the traded to the non-traded sector. If kN > kT , capital increases in relative scarcity which in
turn leads to a fall in the wage rate-rental rate ratio. If kT > kN , capital increases in relative
abundance which raises the ratio w/rK .
Labor
Substituting (44) into sectoral inputs allocation constraints (7d) and (7e), we can solve for
traded and non-traded labor as follows:
LT = LT (K, p) , LN = LN (K, p) , (49)
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Figure 7: Sectoral capital-labor ratios and the real exchange rate
with
LTK =
∂LT
∂K
=
1
kT − kN , (50a)
LTp =
∂LT
∂p
=
1
(kT − kN )2
[
LTh
fkk
+
LNf
p2hkk
]
< 0, (50b)
LNK =
∂LN
∂K
=
1
kN − kT , (50c)
LNp =
∂LN
∂p
= − 1
(kT − kN )2
[
LTh
fkk
+
LNf
p2hkk
]
> 0. (50d)
From (50a) and (50c), when the capital stock rises, labor must shift to the sector which is
relatively more capital intensive. If the relative of non traded goods increases, i .e. dp > 0,
this causes a shift of labor from the traded to the non-traded sector, irrespective of the sectoral
capital intensities.
Output
Substituting short-run static solutions for capital-labor ratios (44) and for labor (49) into the
production functions, we can solve for the traded and non-traded output:
Y T = Y T (K, p) , Y N = Y N (K, p) , (51)
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with
Y TK =
∂Y T
∂K
=
f
kT − kN , (52a)
Y Tp =
∂Y T
∂p
=
1
(kN − kT )2
[
pLT (h)2
fkk
+
LN (f)2
p2hkk
]
< 0, (52b)
Y NK =
∂Y N
∂K
=
h
kN − kT , (52c)
Y Np =
∂Y N
∂p
= − 1
p (kT − kN )2
[
pLT (h)2
fkk
+
LN (f)2
p2hkk
]
> 0. (52d)
A real exchange rate appreciation attracts resources from the traded to the non traded sector
which in turn raises Y N .
From equations (52a)-(52d), we deduce the following useful properties
Y Tp + pY
N
p = 0, (53a)
Y TK + pY
N
K =
f − ph
kT − kN = fk = phk > 0. (53b)
B Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
Equilibrium Dynamics
Inserting short-run static solutions (10) and (11) into (7g) and (7h), linearizing these equa-
tions around the steady-state, and denoting x˜ = K˜, p˜ the long-term values of x = K, p, we obtain
in a matrix form: (
K˙, p˙
)T
= J
(
K(t)− K˜, p(t)− p˜
)T
, (54)
where J is given by
J ≡
 b11 b12
b21 b22
 , (55)
with
b11 = Y NK =
h˜
k˜N − k˜T
≷ 0, b12 = Y Np − cNp > 0, (56a)
b21 = 0, b22 = −p˜hkkkNp = −
f˜
p˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) ≶ 0. (56b)
By denoting µ the eigenvalue of matrix J, the characteristic equation for the matrix (55) of
the linearized system can be written as follows
µ2 − r?µ− p˜hkkkNp Y NK = 0, (57)
35
where we used the fact that Y NK − p˜hkkkNp = r? and δ = r?. The determinant denoted by Det of
the linearized 2× 2 matrix (55) is unambiguously negative
Det J = b11b22 = −p˜hkkkNp Y NK = −
f˜ h˜
p˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
)2 < 0, (58)
and the trace denoted by Tr is positive
Tr J = b11 + b22 = r? > 0. (59)
From (57), the characteristic root obtained from J writes as follows:
µi ≡ 12
r? ±
√√√√√(r?)2 + 4 f˜ h˜
p˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
)2
 ≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (60)
We denote by µ1 < 0 and µ2 > 0 the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying
µ1 < 0 < r? < µ2. (61)
Since the system features one state variable, K, and one jump variable, p, the equilibrium yields
a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.
Formal Solutions
General solutions paths are given by :
K(t)− K˜ = B1eµ1t +B2eµ2t, (62a)
p(t)− p˜ = ω12B1eµ1t + ω22B2eµ2t, (62b)
where we normalized ωi1 to unity. The eigenvector ω
i
2 associated with eigenvalue µi is given by
ωi2 = −
µi − b11
b12
, (63)
with
b11 = h˜LNK =
h˜
k˜N − k˜T
≷ 0, (64a)
b12 = Y Np − cNp = Y Np − p′′c c˜− p′ccp > 0. (64b)
Case kN > kT
This assumption reflects the fact that the capital intensity of the non traded good sector
exceeds the capital intensity of the traded sector. The stable and unstable eigenvalues given by
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(60) may be rewritten in the following form
µ1 = − f˜
p˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) < 0, (65a)
µ2 =
h˜(
k˜N − k˜T
) > 0. (65b)
From (45) and (52), we may deduce the signs of several useful expressions
Y NK = µ2 > 0, (66a)
Y TK = p˜µ1 < 0, (66b)
p˜hkkk
N
p = −µ1 > 0. (66c)
We write out eigenvectors ωi, corresponding to eigenvalue µi with i = 1, 2, to determine their
signs
ω1 =
 1 (+)
µ1−µ2
(Y Np −cNp )
(−)
 , ω2 =
 1 (+)
0
 . (67)
Case kT > kN
This assumption reflects the fact that the capital intensity of the traded good sector exceeds
the capital intensity of the non traded sector. The stable and unstable eigenvalues given by (60)
may be rewritten in the following form
µ1 =
h˜(
k˜N − k˜T
) < 0, (68a)
µ2 = − f˜
p˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) > 0, (68b)
From (45) and (52), the following expressions can be derived
Y NK = µ1 < 0, (69a)
Y TK = p˜µ2 > 0, (69b)
p˜hkkk
N
p = −µ2 < 0. (69c)
We write out the two eigenvectors ωi, corresponding to eigenvalues µi with i = 1, 2, to determine
their signs
ω1 =
 1 (+)
0
 , ω2 =
 0
µ2−µ1
(Y Np −cNp )
(+)
 . (70)
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Formal Solution for n
We first linearize equation (7i) around the steady-state:
n˙(t) = r? (n(t)− n˜) + Y TK
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+
[
Y Tp − cTp
]
(p(t)− p˜) . (71)
where cTp is given by (43a). Inserting the stable solutions for
(
K(t)− K˜
)
and (p(t)− p˜), the
solution for the stock of net foreign assets writes as follows:
n˙(t) = r? (n(t)− n˜) + Y TK
2∑
i=1
Aie
µit +
[
Y Tp − cTp
] 2∑
i=1
Aiω
i
2e
µit. (72)
Solving the differential equation leads to the following expression:
n(t)− n˜ =
[
(n0 − n˜)− N1B1
µ1 − r? −
N2B2
µ2 − r?
]
er
?t
+
N1B1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
N2B2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t, (73)
with
Ni = Y TK +
[
Y Tp − cTp
]
ωi2, i = 1, 2. (74)
Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, i. e. equation (8), the terms
in brackets of equation (73) must be null and we must set B2 = 0. Inserting the value for the
constant B1 given by equation (62a) evaluated at time t = 0, we obtain the linearized version of
the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:
n0 − n˜ = N1
µ1 − r?
(
K0 − K˜
)
. (75)
The stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:
n(t)− n˜ = N1B1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t. (76)
Case kN > kT
N1 = Y TK +
[
Y Tp − cTp
]
ω12,
= p˜µ2
(
1 +
1
µ2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
)
≷ 0, (77a)
N2 = Y TK +
[
Y Tp − cTp
]
ω22,
= Y TK = p˜µ1 < 0, (77b)
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where we used the fact that ω22 = 0. The sign of N1/ (µ1 − r?) is ambiguous and reflects
the impact of the capital accumulation on the net foreign assets accumulation along a stable
transitional path :
n˙(t) =
N1
µ1 − r? K˙(t).
where K˙(t) = µ1B1eµ1t. Since empirical studies suggest that the two macroeconomic aggregates
are negatively correlated (see e. g. Glick and Rogoff [1995]), we will impose thereafter that
Assumption 1
N1
µ1 − r? < 0 which implies that N1 > 0.
The assumption under which N1 > 0 may be rewritten as follows
µ2 > − c˜
N
p˜
σcω
1
2. (78)
Case kT > kN
N1 = Y TK +
[
Y Tp − cTp
]
ω12,
= Y TK = p˜µ2 > 0, (79a)
N2 = Y TK +
[
Y Tp − cTp
]
ω22,
= p˜µ1
(
1 +
1
µ1
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
)
≷ 0, (79b)
where Y TK = p˜µ2 and ω
1
2 = 0.
C Long-Run Effects of Unanticipated Permanent Fiscal Expan-
sions
We totally differentiate the system (16) evaluated at the steady-state. In a matrix form, we get:
hkkk
N
p 0 0 0(
Y Np − cNp
)
Y NK 0 −p′ccλ¯(
Y Tp − cTp
)
Y TK r
? − (1− αc) pccλ¯
0 − N1µ1−r? 1 0


dp˜
dK˜
dn˜
dλ¯

=

0
dgN
dgT
0

(80)
Determinant of matrix of coefficients is given by
D = hkkkNp
pcc˜σc
λ¯
[
Y NK − r?
αc
p˜
(
p˜+
N1
µ1 − r?
)]
. (81)
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We have to consider two cases, depending on wether the non-traded sector is more or less capital
intensive than the traded sector :
D = −µ1µ2pcc˜σc
p˜λ¯
> 0, case kT > kN , (82a)
D = −µ1pcc˜σc
p˜λ¯
[
µ2 + αc
r?
µ2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
]
> 0, case kN > kT . (82b)
The term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (82b) is positive if the following inequality
holds
µ2 > −αc r
?
µ2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2. (83)
From (78), this inequality is satisfied since αc
r?
µ2
< 1.
Long-Run Effects of an Unanticipated Permanent Shock in the Government Expenditure on
the Traded Good
case kN > kT
dc˜
dgT
= − 1
p˜c
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] < 0, (84a)
dλ¯
dgT
=
αcλ¯
σcp˜c˜N
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] > 0, (84b)
dp˜
dgT
= 0, (84c)
dL˜T
dgT
=
αc
p˜h˜
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] > 0, (84d)
dK˜
dgT
= − αc
p˜µ2
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] < 0, (84e)
dn˜
dgT
=
αc
µ2
[
1 + 1µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] > 0. (84f)
case kT > kN
40
dc˜
dgT
= − 1
p˜c
< 0, (85a)
dλ¯
dgT
=
αcλ¯
σcp˜c˜N
> 0, (85b)
dp˜
dgT
= 0, (85c)
dL˜T
dgT
=
αc
p˜h˜
> 0, (85d)
dK˜
dgT
= − αc
p˜µ1
> 0, (85e)
dn˜
dgT
=
αc
µ1
< 0. (85f)
Long-Run Effects of an Unanticipated Permanent Shock in the Government Expenditure on
the Non Traded Good
case kN > kT
dc˜
dgN
= − p˜
p˜c
[
1 + r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] < 0, (86a)
dλ¯
dgN
=
αcλ¯
σcc˜N
[
1 + r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] > 0, (86b)
dp˜
dgN
= 0, (86c)
dL˜T
dgN
= − (1− αc)
h˜
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] < 0, (86d)
dK˜
dgN
=
(1− αc)
µ2
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] > 0, (86e)
dn˜
dgN
= −
p˜ (1− αc)
[
1 + 1µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
µ2
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] < 0. (86f)
case kT > kN
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dc˜
dgN
= − p˜
p˜c
< 0, (87a)
dλ¯
dgN
=
αcλ¯
σcp˜c˜N
> 0, (87b)
dp˜
dgN
= 0, (87c)
dL˜T
dgN
= −(1− αc)
h˜
< 0, (87d)
dK˜
dgN
=
(1− αc)
µ1
< 0, (87e)
dn˜
dgN
= − p˜ (1− αc)
µ1
> 0. (87f)
D Unanticipated Temporary Demand and Supply Disturbances:
A Consistent Solution Method for the Two-Sector Model
Following Schubert and Turnovsky [2002], we define a viable steady-state i starting at time Tj
to be one that is consistent with long-run solvency, given the stocks of capital, KTj and foreign
bonds, nTj . We rewrite the system of steady-state equations (16) for an arbitrary period j :
hk
[
k˜N (p˜j)
]
= r?, (88a)
Y N
(
K˜j , p˜j
)
− p′c (p˜j) c˜j − gNj = 0, (88b)
r?n˜j + Y T
(
K˜j , p˜j
)
− (1− αc) pc (p˜j) c˜j − gTj = 0, (88c)
together with the intertemporal solvency condition(
n˜j − nTj
)
=
N1
µ1 − r?
(
K˜j −KTj
)
. (88d)
Viable steady-state and the two-step method
The new consistent procedure consists in two steps. In a first step, we solve the system
(88a)-(88c) for p˜j , K˜j and n˜j as functions of the marginal utility of wealth, λ¯j , the government
expenditure on the traded and non traded goods. Totally differentiating equations (88a)-(88c)
yields in matrix form:
hkkk
N
p 0 0(
Y Np − cNp
)
Y NK 0(
Y Tp − cTp
)
Y TK r
?


dp˜j
dK˜j
dn˜j
 =

0
p′ccλ¯dλ¯j + dgNj
(1− αc) pccλ¯dλ¯j + dgTj
 (89)
The equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth λ¯j and policy parameters, gTj , g
N
j ,
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determine the following steady-state values:
p˜j = constant, (90a)
K˜j = K
(
λ¯j , g
N
j
)
, (90b)
n˜j = v
(
λ¯j , g
T
j , g
N
j
)
, (90c)
with partial derivatives given by:
Kλ¯ ≡
∂K˜j
∂λ¯j
=
hkkk
N
p pcp
′
cr
?
G
= −σc
c˜Nj
λ¯j
(
k˜Nj − k˜Tj
)
h˜j
≶ 0, (91a)
vλ¯ ≡
∂n˜j
∂λ¯j
=
hkkk
N
p pc
(−p′cY TK + (1− αc) pcY NK )
G
,
=
pcc˜j
λ¯j
σc
Y NK r
?
αcr? − h˜j(
k˜Nj − k˜Tj
)
 ,
= −pcc˜j
λ¯j
σc
r?p˜h˜j
[
αcf˜j + (1− αc) p˜j h˜j
]
< 0, (91b)
and
KgT ≡
∂K˜j
∂gTj
= 0, (92a)
vgT ≡
∂n˜j
∂gTj
=
1
r?
> 0, (92b)
and
KgN ≡
∂K˜j
∂gNj
=
hkkk
N
p uccr
?
G
=
(
k˜Nj − k˜Tj
)
h˜j
≷ 0, (93a)
vgN ≡
∂n˜j
∂gNj
= −hkkk
N
p uccY
T
K
G
=
f˜j
h˜j
1
r?
> 0, (93b)
where G ≡ hkkkNp uccY NK r? which simplifies as follows :
G ≡ f˜ h˜
p˜2
(
k˜N − k˜T
)2uccr? < 0. (94)
The second step consists to determine the equilibrium change of λ¯j by taking the total
differential of the intertemporal solvency condition (88d):[
vλ¯ −
N1
µ1 − r?Kλ
]
dλ¯j = dnTj −
N1
µ1 − r?dKTj −
[
vgN −
N1
µ1 − r?KgN
]
dgNj
− vgT dgTj , (95)
from which may solve for the equilibrium value of λ¯j as a function of initial stocks at time Tj
and government spending:
λ¯ = λ
(
KTj , nTj , g
T , gN
)
, (96)
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with
λK ≡ ∂λ¯j
∂KTj
= −
N1
µ1−r?[
vλ¯ − N1µ1−r?Kλ¯
] < 0, (97a)
λn ≡ ∂λ¯j
∂nTj
=
1[
vλ¯ − N1µ1−r?Kλ¯
] < 0, (97b)
λgT ≡
∂λ¯j
∂gTj
= − vgT[
vλ¯ − N1µ1−r?Kλ¯
] > 0, (97c)
λgN ≡
∂λ¯j
∂gNj
= −
[
vgN − N1µ1−r?KgN
]
[
vλ¯ − N1µ1−r?Kλ¯
] > 0. (97d)
From (97), we obtain the following properties:
λn
[
vλ¯ −
N1
µ1 − r?Kλ¯
]
= 1, (98a)
λnvgT = −λgT , (98b)
λn
[
vgN −
N1
µ1 − r?KgN
]
= −λgN . (98c)
Formal Solutions for Temporary Demand and Supply Disturbances
We assume that the small open economy is initially in steady-state equilibrium, denoted by
the subscript j = 0:
K0 = K˜0 = K
(
λ¯0, g
N
0
)
= K
(
λ
(
K0, n0, g
T
0 , g
N
0
)
, gN0
)
, (99a)
n0 = n˜0 = v
(
λ¯0, g
T
0 , g
N
0
)
= v
(
λ
(
K0, n0, g
T
0 , g
N
0
)
, gT0 , g
N
0
)
, (99b)
λ0 = λ¯0 = λ
(
K0, n0, g
T
0 , g
N
0
)
. (99c)
We suppose now that government expenditure changes unexpectedly at time t = 0 from the
original level gT0 (resp. g
N
0 ) to level g
T
1 (resp. g
N
1 ) over the period 0 ≤ t < T , and reverts back
at time T permanently to its initial level, gTT = gT2 = gT0 (resp. gNT = gN2 = gN0 ).
Period 1 (0 ≤ t < T )
Whereas the fiscal expansion is implemented, the economy follows unstable transitional paths:
K(t) = K˜1 +B1eµ1t +B2eµ2t, (100a)
p(t) = p˜1 + ω12B1e
µ1t + ω22B2e
µ2t, (100b)
n(t) = n˜1 +
[
(n0 − n˜1)− N1
µ1 − r?B1 −
N2
µ2 − r?B2
]
er
?t +
+
N1
µ1 − r?B1e
µ1t +
N2
µ2 − r?B2e
µ2t, (100c)
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with the steady-state values K˜1 and n˜1 given by the following functions (determined from (90b)-
(90c) with j = 1)
K˜1 = K
(
λ¯, gN1
)
, (101a)
n˜1 = v
(
λ¯, gT1 , g
N
1
)
, (101b)
where the marginal utility of wealth remains constant over periods 1 and 2 at level λ¯1 = λ¯2 = λ¯
after its initial jump at time t = 0.
Period 2 (t ≥ T )
Once government spending reverts back to its initial level, the economy follows stable paths
K(t) = K˜2 +B′1e
µ1t, (102a)
p(t) = p˜2 + ω12B
′
1e
µ1t, (102b)
n(t) = n˜2 +
N1
µ1 − r?B
′
1e
µ1t, (102c)
with the steady-state values K˜2 and n˜2 given by the following functions (determined from (90b)-
(90c) with j = 2)
K˜2 = K
(
λ¯, gN2
)
, (103a)
n˜2 = v
(
λ¯, gT2 , g
N
2
)
. (103b)
During the transition period 1, the economy accumulates capital and foreign assets. Since
this period is unstable, it would lead the nation to violate its intertemporal budget constraint.
By contrast, the adjustment process taking place in period 2 is stable and must satisfy the
economy’s intertemporal budget constraint. At the same time, the zero-root problem requires
the equilibrium value of marginal utility of wealth to adjust once-and-for-all when the shock hits
the economy. So λ remains constant over the periods 1 and 2. The aim of the two-step method is
to calculate the deviation of λ such that the country satisfies one single and overall intertemporal
budget constraint, given the new relevant initial conditions, KT and nT , prevailing when the
shock ends and accumulated over the unstable period. Therefore, for the country to remain
intertemporally solvent, we require:
nT − n˜2 = N1
µ1 − r?
(
KT − K˜2
)
. (104)
In order to determine the three constants B1, B2, and B′1, and the equilibrium value of
marginal utility of wealth, we impose three conditions:
45
1. Initial conditions K(0) = K0, n(0) = n0 must be met.
2. Economic aggregates K and p remain continuous at time T .
3. The intertemporal solvency constraint (104) must hold implying that the net foreign assets
remain continuous at time T .
Set t = 0 in solution (100a), equate (100a) and (102a), (100b) and (102b), evaluated at time
t = T , one obtains
K˜1 +B1 +B2 = K0, (105a)
K˜1 +B1eµ1T +B2eµ2T = K˜2 +B′1e
µ1T , (105b)
p˜1 + ω12B1e
µ1T + ω22B2e
µ2T = p˜2 + ω12B
′
1e
µ1T , (105c)
where we used the continuity condition.
Evaluating KT and nT from respectively (100a) and (100c), substituting into (104), and
using functions of steady-state values K˜j and n˜j given by (99) (for j = 0), (101) (for j = 1), and
(103) (for j = 2), the intertemporal solvency condition can be rewritten as
v
(
λ¯, gT1 , g
N
1
)
+
[ (
v
(
λ0, g
T
0 , g
N
0
)− v (λ¯, gT1 , gN1 ))− N1µ1 − r?B1 − N2µ2 − r?B2
]
er
?T
+
N1
µ1 − r?B1e
µ1T +
N2
µ2 − r?B2e
µ2T − v (λ¯, gT2 , gN2 )
=
N1
µ1 − r?
[
K
(
λ¯, gN1
)
+B1eµ1T +B2eµ2T −K
(
λ¯, gN2
)]
. (106)
Then, we approximate the steady-state changes with the differentials by using the dummy
notation:
K˜1 − K˜0 ≡ K
(
λ¯, gN1
)−K (λ0, gN0 ) = Kλ¯dλ¯+KgNdgN , (107a)
K˜2 − K˜1 ≡ K
(
λ¯, gN2
)−K (λ¯, gN1 ) = −KgNdgN , (107b)
n˜1 − n˜0 ≡ v
(
λ¯, gT1 , g
N
1
)− v (λ0, gT0 , gN0 ) = vλ¯dλ¯+ vgT dgT + vgNdgN , (107c)
n˜2 − n˜1 ≡ v
(
λ¯, gT2 , g
N
2
)− v (λ¯, gT1 , gN1 ) = −vgT dgT − vgNdgN , (107d)
where dλ¯ ≡ λ¯− λ0.
By substituting these expressions in (105) and (106), we obtain finally
B1 +B2 = −Kλ¯dλ¯−KgNdgN , (108a)
B1e
µ1T +B2eµ2T −B′1eµ1T = −KgNdgN , (108b)
ω12B1e
µ1T + ω22B2e
µ2T − ω12B′1eµ1T = 0, (108c)
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and
B1Υ1 +B2Υ2 + vλ¯dλ¯ = Φ1, (109)
where we set
Υ1 ≡ N1
µ1 − r? , (110a)
Υ2 ≡ N2
µ2 − r? +
(
N1
µ1 − r? −
N2
µ2 − r?
)
e−µ1T , (110b)
Φ1 ≡
[(
vgj −
N1
µ1 − r?Kgj
)
e−r
?T − vgj
]
dgj j = T,N, (110c)
where KgT = 0.
case kN > kT
We write out some useful expressions
Kλ¯ = −
c˜N
λ¯
σc
µ2
< 0, (111a)
KgN =
1
µ2
> 0, (111b)
vλ¯ = −
pcc˜
λ¯
σc
µ2r?
[(1− αc)µ2 − αcµ1] < 0, (111c)
vgN = −
p˜µ1
µ2r?
> 0, (111d)(
vλ¯ −
N1
µ1 − r?Kλ¯
)
= −pcc˜
λ¯
σc
µ2r?
[
µ2 + αc
r?
µ2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
]
< 0, (111e)(
vgN −
N1
µ1 − r?KgN
)
=
p˜
µ2r?
[
µ2 +
r?
µ2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
]
> 0, (111f)
Υ2 = −p˜
[
1 +
c˜N
p˜
σc
µ2
ω12e
−µ1T
]
, (111g)
vλ¯ −Υ2Kλ¯ = −
pcc˜
λ¯
σc
r?µ2
[
µ2 + αc
r?
µ2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2e
−µ1T
]
< 0, (111h)
Φ1Kλ¯ + vλ¯KgNdg
N = −pcc˜
λ¯
σc
r? (µ2)
2
{
αc
[
µ2 +
r?
µ2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
]
e−r
?T + (1− αc)µ2
}
dgN < 0,
(111i)
and vgT = 1/r? > 0. We used the fact that k˜Tµ2 + k˜Nµ1 = −wp˜ and the following expression:
Φ1 = − 1
r?
(
1− e−r?T
)
dgT +
p˜
r?µ2
{
µ1 +
[
µ2 +
r?
µ2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
]
e−r
?T
}
dgN . (112)
case kT > kN
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We write out some useful expressions
Kλ¯ = −
c˜N
λ¯
σc
µ1
> 0, (113a)
KgN =
1
µ1
< 0, (113b)
vλ¯ = −
pcc˜
λ¯
σc
µ1r?
[(1− αc)µ1 − αcµ2] < 0, (113c)
vgN = −
p˜µ2
µ1r?
> 0, (113d)(
vλ¯ −
N1
µ1 − r?Kλ¯
)
= −pcc˜
λ¯
σc
r?
< 0 (113e)(
vgN −
N1
µ1 − r?KgN
)
=
p˜
r?
> 0, (113f)
Υ2 = −p˜
[
1 +
c˜N
p˜
σc
µ1
ω22
(
1− e−µ1T )] < 0, (113g)
vλ¯ −Υ2Kλ¯ = −
pcc˜
λ¯
σc
r?µ1
[
µ1 + αc
r?
µ1
c˜N
p˜
σcω
2
2
(
1− e−µ1T )] ≷ 0, (113h)
Φ1Kλ¯ + vλ¯KgNdg
N = −pcc˜
λ¯
σc
r?µ1
[
(1− αc) + αce−r?T
]
> 0, (113i)
and vgT = 1/r? > 0. We used the fact that k˜Tµ1 + k˜Nµ2 = −wp˜ and the following expression:
Φ1 = − 1
r?
(
1− e−r?T
)
dgT +
p˜
r?µ1
(
µ2 + µ1e−r
?T
)
dgN . (114)
case kN > kT
The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the traded good are given by:
B1
dgT
=
αc
(
1− e−r?T )
p˜µ2
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] > 0, (115a)
B2
dgT
= 0, (115b)
B′1
dgT
=
B1
dgT
, (115c)
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λgT
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0, (115d)
where, from (108a),
B1
dgT
can be written also as follows
B1
dgT
= −Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
. (116)
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The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the non traded good are given by:
B1
dgN
= −
[(
1− e−µ2T )− αc (1− e−r?T )]
µ2
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
= −(1− αc)
(
1− e−µ2T )+ αc (e−r?T − e−µ2T )
µ2
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] < 0, (117a)
B2
dgN
= −e
−µ2T
µ2
< 0, (117b)
B′1
dgN
=
B1
dgN
< 0, (117c)
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
1− e−µ2T ) dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+
uccp˜
(pc)
2
µ2
(
e−r?T − e−µ2T )[
µ2 + αc r
?
µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
= λgN
(1− e−µ2T )− µ2
(
e−r?T − e−µ2T )[
µ2 + r
?
µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
 ≶ 0, (117d)
where we used expression (86b) to obtain (117d). From (108a),
B1
dgT
and
B2
dgT
can also be written
as follows:
B1
dgN
+
B2
dgN
= −Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−KgN and
B2
dgN
= −KgN e−µ2T . (118)
case kT > kN
The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the traded good are given by:
B1
dgT
=
αc
µ1p˜
(
1− e−r?T
)
< 0, (119a)
B2
dgT
= 0, (119b)
B′1
dgT
=
B1
dgT
, (119c)
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λgT
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (119d)
The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the non traded good are given by:
B1
dgN
= − 1
µ1
[
(1− αc) + αce−r?T
]
,
= − 1
µ1
[
(1− αc)
(
1− e−r?T
)
+ e−r
?T
]
> 0, (120a)
B2
dgN
= 0, (120b)
B′1
dgN
=
B1
dgN
+KgN e
−µ1T
= − 1
µ1
[(
1− e−µ1T )− αc (1− e−r?T )] < 0, (120c)
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λgN
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (120d)
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E Transitional Dynamics
E.1 An Unanticipated Rise in Government Spending on the Traded Good
Steady-State Changes
It is convenient to determine first the long-run changes of the real consumption, the stock
of physical capital and the stock of foreign assets following an unanticipated permanent rise in
government spending on the traded good by differentiating the functions (40) and (90):
dc˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (121a)
dK˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
≶ 0 depending on wether kN ≷ kT , (121b)
dn˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ vgT ≷ 0 depending on wether kN ≷ kT , (121c)
where cgT = 0 and KgT = 0. Expressions of the steady-state changes are given by the set of
equations (84) and (85).
We compare the once-for-all jump of the marginal utility of wealth after an unanticipated
permanent increase in public spending on the traded good with respect to its change after a
permanent rise:
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
= λgT
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (122)
We now evaluate the long-run changes of key economic variables after an unanticipated
temporary public policy by differentiating functions (40) and (90). Since the signs of expressions
depend crucially on the sectoral capital intensities, we consider two cases.
Case kN > kT
When the non traded sector is relatively more capital intensive, the variations of macroeco-
nomic aggregates in the long-run are given by:
dc˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= cλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (123a)
dK˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (123b)
dn˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= vλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (123c)
where cλ¯ < 0, Kλ¯ < 0 (if k
N > kT ), and vλ¯ < 0.
The changes of the period 1 steady-state values K˜1 and n˜1 compared to their initial (given)
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values K0 and n0 are given by :
dK˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (124a)
dn˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ vgT > 0, (124b)
where Kλ¯ < 0, vλ¯ < 0 and vgT > 0. From (121b)-(121c), (123b)-(123c), and (124a)-(124b), we
are able to deduce the following inequalities:
K˜perm < K˜1 = K˜temp < K0, (125a)
n˜temp < n0 < n˜perm < n˜1. (125b)
Case kT > kN
When the traded sector is relatively more capital intensive, the variations of macroeconomic
aggregates in the long-run are given by
dc˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= cλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (126a)
dK˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
> 0, (126b)
dn˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= vλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (126c)
It is interesting to compare the magnitudes of the long-run changes in the stock of interna-
tional assets between a permanent and a temporary fiscal expansion:
dn˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= vλ¯λgT + vgT R vλ¯λgT
(
1− e−r?T
)
=
dn˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
. (127)
The key factor that determines the magnitude of the long-run change in the stock of foreign
assets is the period of implementation of the government policy. More specifically, there exists a
time T = T˜ for which the two changes are equal which is given by
T˜ = 1
r?
ln
[
−vλ¯λgT
vgT
]
. (128)
For high durations of the policy, i. e. T > T˜ , the deterioration in the net foreign asset position
features a greater magnitude after a temporary fiscal expansion compared to a permanent policy.
We may summarize our results as follows:
n˜temp < n˜perm < n0 if T > T˜ , (129a)
n˜perm < n˜temp < n0 if T < T˜ . (129b)
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The changes of the period 1 steady-state values K˜1 and n˜1 compared to their initial (given)
values K˜0 and n˜0 are given by :
dK˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
> 0, (130a)
dn˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ vgT ≷ 0, (130b)
where Kλ¯ > 0, vλ¯ < 0 and vgT > 0. The sign of (130b) remains undetermined but we are
able to determine the length of the government spending change, denoted by T¯ , for which the
steady-state state change (130b) turns to be null:
T¯ = − 1
r?
ln
[
vλ¯λgT + vgT
vλ¯λgT
]
. (131)
Existence of T¯ relies upon inequality vλ¯λgT < vλ¯λgT + vgT < 0 which in turn implies that
the term in square brackets is positive and less than unity. Consequently, we get the following
inequality:
n˜1 ≶ n0 depending on wether T ≷ T¯ . (132)
From (121b)-(121c), (126b)-(126c), (129) and (130a)-(130b), we are able to deduce the fol-
lowing inequalities:
K0 < K˜1 = K˜temp < K˜perm, (133a)
n˜perm < n˜temp < n0 if T < T˜ , (133b)
n˜temp < n˜perm < n˜0 if T > T˜ , (133c)
where we assume that T˜ < T¯ .
Transitional Dynamics after an Unanticipated Permanent Increase in Govern-
ment Spending on the Traded Good
As we have derived previously, the stable adjustment of the economy is described by a saddle-
path in (K, p)-space. The capital stock, the real exchange rate, and the stock of traded bonds
evolve according to:
K(t) = K˜ +B1eµ1t, (134a)
p(t) = p˜+ ω12B1e
µ1t, (134b)
n(t) = n˜+
N1
µ1 − r?B1e
µ1t, (134c)
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where ω12 = 0 if k
T > kN and with
B1 = K0 − K˜ = − dK˜dgT dg
T ,
where we made use of the constancy of K at time t = 0 (i. e. K0 is predetermined).
case kN > kT
Using the fact that the steady-state value of the real exchange rate remains affected by an
unanticipated permanent rise in gT , the initial jump of p is given by
dp(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −ω12
dK˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (135)
From the short-run static solutions, and by substituting the change in the equilibrium value of
the marginal utility of wealth and the initial jump of the real exchange rate, we get the response
of the real consumption at time t = 0:
dc(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ cp
dp(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −
[
1 + αc 1µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
pc
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] ,
=
[
1 + αc
1
µ2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
]
dc˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (136)
where 0 <
[
1 + αc 1µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
< 1. Therefore, we deduce the following inequality
dc˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
<
dc(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (137)
Irrespective of the sectoral capital intensity, a rise in government spending on the traded good
induces a once-for-all upward jump of the marginal utility of wealth which reduces the real
consumption. When the non-traded sector is more capital intensive, the initial fall of real con-
sumption is moderated by the depreciation of the real exchange rate at time t = 0 and falls by
less than in the long-run.
Differentiating solutions (134), with respect to time, one obtains:
K˙(t) = −µ1 dK˜dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdgT < 0, (138a)
p˙(t) = −µ1ω12
dK˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdgT > 0, (138b)
n˙(t) = −µ1 N1
µ1 − r?
dK˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdgT > 0, (138c)
where
N1
µ1 − r? < 0 and
dK˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0.
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From equation (38), along the stable adjustment, the real consumption decreases:
c˙ = −σccαc p˙
p
< 0, (139)
where
(
r? − αc p˙
p
)
corresponds to the consumption-based real interest rate. After its initial de-
preciation, the real exchange rate appreciates to revert back to its initial value. This appreciation
raises the consumption-based real interest rate above the world interest rate which depresses real
consumption.
case kT > kN
Differentiating solutions (134), with respect to time, one obtains
K˙(t) = −µ1 dK˜dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdgT > 0, (140a)
p˙(t) = 0, (140b)
n˙(t) = −µ1 N1
µ1 − r?
dK˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdgT < 0, (140c)
where
N1
µ1 − r? < 0 and
dK˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
> 0.
Transitional Dynamics after an Unanticipated Temporary Increase in Govern-
ment Spending on the Traded Good
case kN > kT
By evaluating formal solution for p(t) and differentiating with respect to gT , we get the initial
jump of p
dp(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −ω12
(
1− e−r?T
) dK˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (141)
By adopting a similar procedure, we obtain the initial response of the investment flow following
an unanticipated temporary rise in government spending on the traded good :
dI(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
1− e−r?T
) dI(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (142)
By differentiating the formal solution (100c) over period 1 for n(t) with respect to time, remem-
bering that B2/dgT = 0, then evaluating this at t = 0, and differentiating with respect to gT ,
we obtain the initial response of the current account following a fiscal expansion:
dca(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −r?
[
dn˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− N1
µ1 − r?
dK˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
+ µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
B1
dgT
.
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The expression in brackets can be evaluated by using properties (98), and the fact that vgT =
−λgT /λn:
−
[
dn˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− N1
µ1 − r?
dK˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
= −
[
vλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ vgT −
N1
µ1 − r?Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
,
= −
[
λgT
λn
(
1− e−r?T
)
− λgT
λn
]
,
= −vgT e−r
?T . (143)
Inserting this expression, and remembering that
dn˜
dgT
=
N1
µ1 − r?
dK˜
dgT
, we obtain the reaction of
the current account at time t = 0:
dca(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −e−r?T − µ1 N1
µ1 − r?Kλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
)
λgT ,
= −e−r?T − µ1 dn˜dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
≶ 0. (144)
The initial current account response is the result of two conflictory forces: [i] a smoothing effect
which deteriorates the current account, and [ii] the negative investment flow which improves the
external asset position. From (144), there exists a critical value of shock’s length, Tˆ > 0, such
that the current account is initially null, i. e. n˙ (0) = 0. Solving (144) for Tˆ , one obtains
Tˆ = 1
r?
ln

1− µ1 dn˜dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
−µ1 dn˜dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
 , (145)
where the term in square brackets is higher than one.
The dynamics of the capital stock and the real exchange rate over period 1 are obtained by
taking the time derivative of equations (100a) and (100b)
K˙(t) = µ1
B1
dgT
eµ1tdgT = −µ1 dK˜dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
eµ1tdgT < 0, (146a)
p˙(t) = µ1ω12
B1
dgT
eµ1tdgT = −ω12µ1
dK˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
eµ1tdgT > 0, (146b)
where we used the fact that B1/dgT = − dK˜dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
.
While the real exchange rate and the stock of physical capital evolve in the same direction
than after an unanticipated permanent rise in government spending on the traded good, the
differentiation with respect to time of solution (100c) indicates that the current account may
change of sign over period 1:
ca(t) = n˙(t) = −e−r?(T −t)dgT − µ1 dn˜dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
eµ1tdgT ≶ 0. (147)
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We have now to determine the conditions under which the current account dynamics displays a
non monotonic behavior. Equation (147) reveals that the stock of international assets reaches a
turning point during its transitional adjustment at time Tˆ given by
Tˆ = 1
µ2
ln
[
−µ1 dn˜dgT
∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
er
?T
]
. (148)
The necessary condition for Tˆ > 0, corresponds to:
0 < e−r
?T < −µ1 dn˜dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
⇔ dca(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
> 0. (149)
If the fiscal expansion lasts a short period, i. e. T < Tˆ , the current account initially deteriorates
and the stock of foreign assets decreases monotonically until time T . If the fiscal expansion lasts
a time period longer than Tˆ , the current account initially improves before reaching a turning
point at time Tˆ . Subsequently, the current account deteriorates until time T .
Once the government policy has been removed at time T , the real exchange rate keeps on
depreciating and the capital stock converges towards its new lower steady-state value:
K˙(t) = µ1
B′1
dgT
eµ1tdgT < 0, (150a)
p˙(t) = µ1ω12
B′1
dgT
eµ1tdgT > 0, (150b)
where B′1/dgT = B1/dgT > 0. Over period 2, the current account improves unambiguously as it
can be seen from the time derivative of solution (102c):
n˙(t) = µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
B′1
dgT
eµ1tdgT > 0. (151)
case kT > kN
When the traded sector is relatively more capital intensive, the real exchange rate dynamics
are flat like after a permanent fiscal expansion since the constant B2/dgT is null, i.e. p˙(t) = 0.
The investment flow is positive over period 1
I(t) = K˙(t) = µ1
B1
dgT
eµ1tdgT = −µ1Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
eµ1tdgT > 0. (152)
By differentiating the formal solution (100c) over period 1 with respect to time and remembering
that B2/dgT = 0, one obtains the transitional path for n(t):
ca(t) = −r?
[
dn˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− N1
µ1 − r?
dK˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
er
?tdgT + µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
B1
dgT
eµ1tdgT . (153)
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By evaluating this expressions at t = 0, and differentiating with respect to gT , we obtain the
initial response of the current account following a fiscal expansion:
dca(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −r?
[
dn˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− N1
µ1 − r?
dK˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
+ µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
B1
dgT
.
The expression in brackets can be evaluated by using properties (98), and the fact that vgT =
−λgT /λn:
−
[
dn˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− N1
µ1 − r?
dK˜1
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
= −
[
vλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ vgT −
N1
µ1 − r?Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
,
= −
[
λgT
λn
(
1− e−r?T
)
− λgT
λn
]
,
= −vgT e−r
?T . (154)
Inserting expression (154) and remembering that
dn˜
dgT
=
N1
µ1 − r?
dK˜
dgT
, we obtain the reaction of
the current account at time t = 0:
dca(0)
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −e−r?T − µ1 N1
µ1 − r?Kλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
)
λgT ,
= −
[
e−r
?T + µ1
dn˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)]
< 0. (155)
If kT > kN , both the smoothing effect and the positive investment flow lead to a decumula-
tion of foreign assets. Consequently, the current account deteriorates initially and the stock of
internationally traded bonds keeps on decreasing over period 1:
ca(t) = n˙(t) = −e−r?(T −t)dgT − µ1 dn˜dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
eµ1tdgT < 0. (156)
Over period 2, the stocks of physical capital keeps on decreasing and the current account
deteriorates monotonically:
I(t) = µ1
B′1
dgT
eµ1tdgT > 0, (157a)
ca(t) = µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
B′1
dgT
eµ1tdgT < 0, (157b)
where B′1/dgT = B1/dgT < 0.
E.2 An Unanticipated Rise in Government Spending on the Non Traded
Good
Steady-State Changes
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We derive the ultimate steady-state changes of the economic key variables after an unan-
ticipated permanent rise in government spending on the non traded good by differentiating the
functions (90) w.r.t gN :
dc˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (158a)
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+KgN ≷ 0 depending on wether kN ≷ kT , (158b)
dn˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ vgN ≶ 0 depending on wether kN ≷ kT , (158c)
where analytical expressions are given by the set of equations (86) and (87).
We turn now to the long-run changes of macroeconomic aggregates after an unanticipated
temporary fiscal expansion by considering two cases.
case kN > kT
The equilibrium change of λ¯ is:
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λgN
(1− e−µ2T )− µ2
(
e−r?T − e−µ2T )[
µ2 + r
?
µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
 < 0. (159)
The sign of the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth can be determined
by noting that expression (159) tends towards zero whenever the parameter T tends towards zero
and tends towards λgN when the parameter tends towards ∞. In addition, the term in square
brackets is an increasing and monotonic function of parameter T . Therefore, the change in λ¯ after
an unanticipated temporary rise in government spending lies in the range
[
0, λgN
]
. Consequently,
we can deduce that expression (159) has a positive sign.
Using the functions (90), we deduce the long-run changes for the real consumption, the stock
of physical capital, and the stock of traded bonds:
dc˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (160a)
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (160b)
dn˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (160c)
where cλ¯ < 0, Kλ¯ < 0, and vλ¯ < 0.
The change of the period 1 steady-state value K˜1 compared to its initial (given) value K˜0 is
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given by :
dK˜1
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+KgN ,
=
(1− αc) + αc
[
1 + r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2e
µ1T
]
e−r?T
µ2
[
1 + αc r
?
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] > 0, (161)
where we have substituted the expressions of Kλ¯ < 0 given by (111a),
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣
temp
> 0 given by
(159) and KgN > 0 given by (111b).
The change of the period 1 steady-state value n˜1 compared to its initial (given) value n˜0 is
given by :
dn˜1
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ vgN , (162)
= − p˜
r∗µ2
1[
1 + αc r
∗
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]{ ((1− αc)µ2 − αcµ1) [1 + r∗
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
](
1− e−r∗T
)
+
[
1 + αc
r∗
(µ2)
2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
]
µ1
}
≷ 0,
where we have substituted the expressions of vλ¯ < 0 given by (111c),
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
> 0 given by
(159) and vgN > 0 given by (111d). The sign of expression (162) remains undetermined because
it is the sum of two terms of opposite signs. The first term on the right-hand side of (162) is
negative and is an increasing function of parameter T and may be dominated by the second term
vgN which is positive. We may infer that the shorter-lasting the rise in government expenditure,
the more likely a higher steady-state value n˜1 compared to its initial (given) value n˜0.
It is interesting to compare the magnitudes of the long-run changes in the stock of interna-
tional assets between a permanent and a temporary fiscal expansion:
dn˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ vgN R vλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
dn˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
, (163)
where vgN > 0, vλ¯ < 0 and
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= λgN > 0. The key factor that determines the magnitude
of the long-run change in the stock of foreign assets is the period of implementation of the
government policy. More specifically, simulations indicate that there exists a time T = T´ for
which the two changes are equal. For high durations of the policy, i. e. T > T´ , the deterioration
of the net foreign asset position features a greater magnitude after a temporary fiscal expansion
compared to a permanent policy. This result is reversed when the public policy is implemented
over a short period, say T < T´ .
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From steady-state changes following unanticipated permanent and temporary rise in gov-
ernment expenditure falling on the non traded good, we can deduce the following inequalities
whatever the duration of the public policy:
K˜temp < K0 < K˜perm < K˜1, (164a)
n˜temp < n˜perm < n0, if T > T´ , (164b)
n˜perm < n˜temp < n0, if T < T´ . (164c)
case kT > kN
The equilibrium change of λ¯ is:
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λgN
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (165)
From (165), we see that that change of λ for a temporary change in gN is smaller than after a
permanent increase in gN but in the same direction. Hence we deduce the following inequality:
0 <
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
<
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
. (166)
From the functions (90), we deduce the long-run changes for the real consumption, the stock of
physical capital, and the stock of traded bonds:
dc˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (167a)
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
> 0, (167b)
dn˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (167c)
where cλ¯ < 0, Kλ¯ > 0, and vλ¯ < 0.
The changes of the period 1 steady-state values K˜1 and n˜1 compared to their initial (given)
values K0 and n0 are given by :
dK˜1
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+KgN ,
=
(1− αc) + αce−r?T
µ1
< 0, (168a)
dn˜1
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= vλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ vgN ,
= − p˜
r?µ1
{
(1− αc) r? − [(1− αc)µ1 − αcµ2] e−r?T
}
> 0. (168b)
where we have evaluated the signs of (168a)-(168b) by making use of (113a)-(113d) and (87b).
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From (166), because the change in the equilibrium value of λ¯ following a temporary change in
gN is moderated compared to a permanent increase in government expenditure gN , by making use
of (167b)-(167c), (158b)-(158c), and (168a)-(168b), we are able to infer the following inequalities:
K˜1 < K˜perm < K0 < K˜temp, (169a)
n˜temp < n0 < n˜perm < n˜1. (169b)
Transitional Dynamics after an Unanticipated Permanent Increase in Govern-
ment Spending on the Non Traded Good
Case kN > kT
The initial jump of p is obtained by setting t = 0 in (62b) and then by differentiating with
respect to gN :
dp(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −ω12
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
> 0. (170)
From the short-run static solutions, and by substituting the change in the equilibrium value of
the marginal utility of wealth and the initial jump of the real exchange rate, we get the initial
jump of real consumption:
dc(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ cp
dp(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −
p˜
[
µ2 + r
?
µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
− c˜Nσcω12
pc
[
µ2 + αc r
?
µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
=
dc˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+
(1− αc)
pc
c˜Nσcω
1
2[
µ2 + αc r
?
µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] < 0. (171)
From (171), we deduce the following inequality
dc(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
<
dc˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (172)
The rise in the marginal utility of wealth and the initial appreciation in the real exchange rate
lowers c(0) below its steady-state value. From equation (38), along the stable adjustment, the
real consumption rises:
c˙(t) = −cσcαc p˙(t)
p(t)
> 0, (173)
where the real exchange rate depreciates along the stable adjustment when the non traded
sector is relatively more capital intensive. Otherwise, the real exchange rate’s and thus the real
consumption’s temporal paths are flat.
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The dynamics of the key economic variables after a permanent rise in government spending
falling on the non traded good are as follows:
K˙(t) = −µ1 dK˜dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdgN > 0, (174a)
p˙(t) = −µ1ω12
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdgN < 0, (174b)
n˙(t) = −µ1 N1
µ1 − r?
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdgN < 0. (174c)
Note that the long-run changes for K˜ and n˜ are reversed compared to a permanent rise in
government spending falling on the traded good and thus dynamics.
Case kT > kN
If kT > kN , the initial change in the real consumption is solely affected by the change in
the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth and jumps immediately to its new lower
steady-state level:
dc(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
=
dc˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (175)
Over time, investment decreases and the stock of international assets rises:
I(t) = −µ1 dK˜dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdgN < 0, (176a)
ca(t) = −µ1 N1
µ1 − r?
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdgN > 0. (176b)
Since it will be useful later, we calculate the slope of the trajectory after a permanent fiscal
expansion in the (K,n)-space by differentiating the solutions for n(t) and for K(t) w.r.t time
and dividing the resulting expressions:
dn(t)
dK(t)
=
µ1
N1
µ1−r?
B1
dgN e
µ1t
µ1
B1
dgN e
µ1t
= −p˜ < 0. (177)
Transitional Dynamics after an Unanticipated Temporary Increase in Govern-
ment Spending on the Non Traded Good
case kN > kT
First, we evaluate the constants B1/dgN and B2/dgN :
B1
dgN
= − B2
dgN
−Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−KgN ,
= − dK˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−µ2T )+ ( αc
1− αc
)(
e−r
?T − e−µ2T
)]
< 0. (178a)
B2
dgN
= −KgN e−µ2T = −
e−µ2T
µ2
< 0. (178b)
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By evaluating the formal solution for p(t) at time t = 0, differentiating with respect to gN ,
and remembering that dp˜1/dgN = 0, we get the initial jump of p:
dp(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ω12
B1
dgN
= −ω12
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−µ2T )− ω12αc (e−r?T − e−µ2T )[
µ2 + r
?
µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
= −ω12
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−µ2T )+ ( αc
1− αc
)(
e−r
?T − e−µ2T
)]
> 0, (179)
where we have inserted the steady-state change of the capital stock after a permanent fiscal
expansion falling on the non-traded good given by (86e). From (179), we can see that the
magnitude of the initial appreciation in the real exchange after a temporary fiscal expansion
may be magnified if the policy is implemented during a long period, i. e. for T > 1µ1 ln [αc].
By making use of the short-run static solution (40) for c, we get the response of the real
consumption at time t = 0:
dc(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ cp
dp(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0. (180)
It is now convenient to evaluate the magnitude of the downward jump of real consumption after
a temporary rise in gN compared to its size after a permanent public policy by computing the
following expression:
dc(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− dc(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= cλ¯
[
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
]
+ cp
[
dp(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− dp(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
]
≷ 0.
(181)
The initial response of the investment flow following an unanticipated temporary rise in govern-
ment spending on the non-traded good is given by:
dI(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= µ1
B1
dgN
+ µ2
B2
dgN
= −µ1
(1− αc)
(
1− e−µ2T )+ αc (e−r?T − e−µ2T )[
µ2 + αc r
?
µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
− e−µ2T ,
= −µ1 dK˜dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−µ2T )+ ( αc
1− αc
)(
e−r
?T − e−µ2T
)]
− e−µ2T ≷ 0.
(182)
The sign of expression (182) is not clear-cut. As investment plays the role of clearing the non
traded goods market, its sign depends on the jumps of the real exchange rate and of the marginal
utility of wealth. More specifically, the real exchange rate appreciates which raises in turn the
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production of non traded and decreases their consumption. This effect exerts a positive influence
on investment. But in the same time, if public spending lasts a short period, the marginal utility
of wealth may jump downward which affects positively cN and may more than outweigh the first
effect which leads to a decumulation of capital.
By differentiating the formal solution (100c) over period 1 for n(t) with respect to time, then
evaluating the resulting expressions at t = 0, and differentiating with respect to gN , we obtain
the initial response of the current account following an unanticipated temporary fiscal expansion:
dca(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= r?
{
− dn˜1
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− N1
µ1 − r?
B1
dgN
− N2
µ2 − r?
B2
dgN
}
+µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
B1
dgN
+ µ2
N2
µ2 − r?
B2
dgN
. (183)
In order to simplify the solution (183), we rewrite the term in square brackets as follows
− dn˜1
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−
[
N1
µ1 − r?
B1
dgN
+
N2
µ2 − r?
B2
dgN
]
= −
[
vλ¯ −
N1
µ1 − r?Kλ¯
]
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−
[
vgN −
N1
µ1 − r?KgN
]
+
[
N1
µ1 − r? −
N2
µ2 − r?
]
B2
dgN
,
= −λgN
λn
(1− e−µ2T )− µ2
(
e−r?T − e−µ2T )[
µ2 + r
?
µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
]
+ λgNλn + 1µ2 c˜Nσcω12KgN e−µ2T ,
=
λgN
λn
eµ2T − p˜
r?
e−r
?T +
p˜
µ2r?
[
µ2 +
r?
µ2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
]
e−µ2T ,
= − p˜
r?
e−r
?T < 0, (184)
where we have substituted the expression of the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal
utility of wealth given by (117d), we made use of properties (98), expression (111f) and inserted
these useful expressions:
B1
dgN
= − B2
dgN
−Kλ¯
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−KgN < 0,
N1
µ1 − r? −
N2
µ2 − r? = −
1
µ2
c˜Nσcω
1
2 > 0,
B2
dgN
= −KgN e−µ2T < 0,(
vgN − N1µ1−r?KgN
)
[
µ2 + r
?
µ2
c˜N
p˜ σcω
1
2
] = p˜
µ2r?
> 0.
By inserting (184) into (183), the expression of the initial response of the current account
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reduces to:
dca(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −p˜e−r?T + µ1p˜
(
1 +
1
µ2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
)
dK˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−µ2T )+ ( αc
1− αc
)(
e−r
?T − e−µ2T
)]
+p˜e−µ2T ,
= −p˜
(
1 +
1
µ2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
)
dI(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−µ2T )+ ( αc
1− αc
)(
e−r
?T − e−µ2T
)]
−p˜
(
e−r
?T − e−µ2T
)
< 0, (185)
where we simplified several expressions as follows:
Kλ¯
uccp˜
p2c
µ2 =
p˜c˜N
pcc˜
= αc > 0,
µ2
N2
µ2 − r? − µ1
N1
µ1 − r? = −p˜µ2 + p˜µ1
(
1 +
1
µ2
c˜N
p˜
σcω
1
2
)
< 0.
Now, we investigate the investment and the real exchange rate dynamics over the unstable
period (0, T ), say period 1:
K˙(t) = µ1
B1
dgN
eµ1tdgN + µ2
B2
dgN
eµ2tdgN R 0, (186a)
p˙(t) = µ1ω12
B1
dgN
eµ1tdgN < 0, (186b)
where B1/dgN < 0, B2/dgN < 0, and ω12 < 0. As we can see from (186a), investment dynamics
are the result of two opposite forces. If the initial investment flow is positive, it must turn to be
negative at time t˜ along the trajectory:
t˜ =
1
µ1 − µ2 ln
[
−µ2B2/dg
N
µ1B1/dgN
]
, (187)
where the term in square brackets is less than one under the condition that the initial investment
flow is positive (see (182), otherwise the investment dynamics are monotonic.
The current account dynamics over period 1 is described by the following equation:
ca(t) =
[
p˜e−µ2(T −t)
(
1− e−µ1(T −t)
)
+ µ1
N1
µ1 − r∗
B1
dgN
eµ1t
]
dgN < 0. (188)
We turn now to the analysis of transitional dynamics over the stable period 2. By making use of
standard methods, the adjustments of the stock of physical capital, the real exchange rate and
the stock of international assets are driven by the following equations:
K˙(t) = µ1
B′1
dgN
dgNeµ1t > 0, (189a)
p˙(t) = µ1ω12
B′1
dgN
dgNeµ1t < 0, (189b)
n˙(t) = µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
B′1
dgN
dgNeµ1t < 0. (189c)
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Evaluate (189c) at time t+, and calculate dca (T ) = ca (T +)− ca (T −), we can see that the
current account is continuous in the neighborhood of time T . Thus we have ca (T −) = ca (T +).
Performing the same procedure of investment, we obtain:
dI (T )
dgN
= −µ2 B2dgN e
µ2T = 1. (190)
When the policy is removed at time T , i. e. government spending falls by an amount equals
to dgN (T ) ≡ gN2 − gN1 ≡ −dgN , investment must rise to guarantee that the market-clearing
condition holds at time T .
case kT > kN
Life after an unanticipated permanent fiscal expansion, an unexpected transitory rise in
government spending on the non traded good leaves unaffected the real exchange rate both in
the short-run and in the long-run. To evaluate the investment dynamics, we differentiate the
solution for K(t) given by (100a) with respect to time, evaluate the resulting expression at time
t = 0, and then differentiate with respect to gN , keeping in mind that B2/dgN = 0 if kT > kN :
dI(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= µ1
B1
dgN
= −µ1 1
µ1
[
(1− αc)
(
1− e−r?T
)
+ e−r
?T
]
,
=
dI(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
− e−r?T < 0. (191)
Applying standard methods, the initial response of the current account following an unan-
ticipated temporary fiscal expansion on the non traded good is given by:
dca(0)
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= r?
{
− dn˜1
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− N1
µ1 − r?
B1
dgN
}
+ µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
B1
dgN
,
= p˜ (1− αc)
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0, (192)
where µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
B1
dgN
= p˜
[
(1− αc)
(
1− e−r?T
)
+ e−r
?T
]
and we simplified the term in square
braces as follows:
− dn˜1
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− N1
µ1 − r?
B1
dgN
= −
{[(
vλ¯ −
N1
µ1 − r?Kλ¯
)
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+
(
vgN −
N1
µ1 − r?KgN
)]}
,
=
λgN
λn
e−r
?T = − p˜
r?
e−r
?T < 0. (193)
We investigate the dynamics of the stocks of physical capital and traded bonds by taking the
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time derivative of formal solutions prevailing over period 1:
I(t) = K˙(t) = µ1
B1
dgN
dgNeµ1t,
= −µ1 dK˜dgN
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
dgNeµ1t − e−r?T dgNeµ1t < 0, (194)
and
ca(t) = −r?
[(
v
(
λ¯, gN1
)− v (λ0, gN0 ))+ N1µ1 − r? B1dgN
]
dgNer
?t + µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
B1
dgN
dgNeµ1t,
= p˜
[
(1− αc)
(
1− e−r?T
)
eµ1t − e−r?T
(
er
?t − eµ1t
)]
dgN ≷ 0. (195)
There exists a time t = t´ such that the current account changes of sign:
t´ = − 1
µ2
ln
[
e−r?T
(1− αc) (1− e−r?T ) + e−r?T
]
, (196)
where the term in square brackets is positive and lower than one. Over period 1, the current
account improves first while the negative investment flow more than outweighs the smoothing
effect. At time t´, these two effects cancel each other and after this date, the current account
deteriorates as the smoothing behavior predominates, such that ca (T −) < 0. To see it more
formally, we evaluate (195) at time T −:
ca
(
T−
)
= p˜eµ1T
[(
1− e−µ1T )− αc (1− e−r?T )]dgN < 0. (197)
At time T −, the investment flow is also negative:
I
(T −) = −e−µ2T [1− (1− αc)(1− er?T )] < 0. (198)
We have now to compare the slope of the trajectory after a transitory fiscal expansion over period
0 ≤ t < t´ in the (K,n)-space with the slope of the trajectory after a permanent fiscal expansion:
dn(t)
dK(t)
=
−p˜e−r?(T −t) + µ1 N1µ1−r? B1dgN eµ1t
µ1
B1
dgN e
µ1t
,
= − p˜
{[
(1− αc)
(
1− e−r?T )+ e−r?T ] eµ1t − e−r?(T −t)}
[(1− αc) (1− e−r?T ) + e−r?T ] eµ1t , (199)
where we have substituted the expression of the constant B1/dgN . Over period 0 ≤ t´ < t,
the numerator is positive and the denominator is negative. Thus the slope of the trajectory is
negative in the (K,n)-space. Comparing the terms in numerator and in denominator of (199), it
is straightforward to show that the slope in absolute terms is lower than p˜. Therefore, the slope
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is negative and lower (in absolute terms) than the slope of the trajectory after a permanent fiscal
expansion (equal to −p˜).
We turn now to the investigation of transitional dynamics of key macroeconomic variables
over the stable period, say period 2. By adopting the standard procedure, we get:
I(t) = K˙(t) = µ1
B′1
dgN
dgNeµ1t > 0 (200a)
ca(t) = n˙(t) = µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
B′1
dgN
dgNeµ1t < 0. (200b)
Since the period 2 is a stable period, the dynamics are monotonic. If we can determine the
sign of (200) at time t = T +, we are able to evaluate the transitional dynamics over the entire
period:
I
(T +) = − [(1− αc) (eµ1T − e−µ2T )− (1− e−µ2T )] dgN > 0, (201a)
ca
(T +) = p˜ [(1− αc) (eµ1T − e−µ2T )− (1− e−µ2T )]dgN < 0. (201b)
From (197) and (201b), we deduce that the current account is continuous in the neighborhood
of T , such that ca (T −) = ca (T +) < 0. At the opposite, from (198) and (201a), we see that
investment is not continuous in the neighborhood of T since at this date, it must clear the non
tradable market. To see it formally, we write the non tradable clearing market condition at time
T − and at time T +:
I
(
T−
)
= Y N
[
K
(T −) , e (T −)]− p′c [e (T −)] c [λ (T −) , e (T −)]− gN1 < 0, (202a)
I
(T +) = Y N [K (T +) , e (T +)]− p′c [e (T +)] c [λ (T +) , e (T +)]− gN2 > 0, (202b)
where gN2 = g
N
0 . Goods market equilibrium is subject to two discrete perturbations: one at
time t = 0 when the government raises the public spending, the other at time t = T when the
policy is permanently removed. Since capital is a predetermined variable, it cannot jump at time
t = 0 neither at time t = T . In addition, the marginal utility of wealth jumps at time t = 0 and
remains constant from thereon. So we get λ¯ = λ (T −) = λ (T +). Finally, when the tradable good
sector is relatively more capital intensive, a rise in government spending leaves unaffected the
real exchange rate both in the sort-run and in the long-run, such that p˜ = e (T −) = e (T +). With
output constrained at time T by the capital stock and by the real exchange rate, it therefore
follows from (202) that for the market-clearing condition to hold, we must have
dI (T ) = dK˙ (T ) = −dgN (T ) = dgN > 0, (203)
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where dgN (T ) ≡ gN2 −gN1 ≡ gN0 −gN1 ≡ −dgN . Thus, the non traded goods market equilibrium is
maintained though the investment in physical capital, government expenditure is reduced to its
original level, the investment flow changes of sign and turns to be positive as a greater part of the
non tradable production (Y N ) may be allocated to investment (I) since the global consumption
(cN + gN ) falls.
F Savings
Formal Solution for Financial Wealth
The law of motion for financial wealth (S(t) = a˙(t)) is given by:
a˙(t) = r?a(t) + w (p(t))− pc (p(t)) c
(
λ¯, p(t)
)− Z, (204)
with Z = gT + pgN .
The linearized version of (204) writes as follows:
a˙(t) = r? (a(t)− a˜) + [wp − (p′cc˜+ pccp)− gN] (p(t)− p˜) ,
= r? (a(t)− a˜) +M1 (p(t)− p˜) , (205)
with M1 given by
M1 = −
[
k˜Tµ2 + c˜N (1− σc)− gN
]
< 0,
= −
(
K˜µ2 − σcc˜N
)
< 0 if kN > kT , (206a)
= 0 if kT > kN , (206b)
where we used the fact that k˜Tµ2+ Y˜ N +gN = K˜µ2. Since σc < 1 as empirical evidence suggest,
the sign of M1 given by (206a) is negative.
The general solution for the stock of financial wealth writes as follows:
a(t) = a˜+
[
(a0 − a˜)− M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?B1
]
er
?t +
M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?B1e
µ1t. (207)
where we used the fact that ω22 = 0. Invoking the transversality condition (8), we obtain the
stable solution for financial wealth:
a(t) = a˜+
M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?B1e
µ1t, (208)
and the intertemporal solvency condition
a˜− a0 = M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?
(
K˜ −K0
)
. (209)
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An Unanticipated Permanent Rise in Government Spending
Differentiating (209) w.r.t gi (i = T,N), long-term changes of financial wealth when kN > kT
are given by:
da˜
dgT
=
ω12
µ2
(
K˜µ2 − σcc˜N
) dK˜
dgT
> 0, (210a)
da˜
dgN
=
ω12
µ2
(
K˜µ2 − σcc˜N
) dK˜
dgN
< 0. (210b)
When kT > kN , long-term changes of financial wealth are given by:
da˜
dgT
=
da˜
dgN
= 0. (211)
Another way to compute long-term changes of financial wealth is to first linearize its ex-
pression defined by the sum of internationally traded bonds and domestic shares : a(t) =
n(t) + p(t)K(t). The linearization in the neighborhood of the steady-state yields:
a(t)− a˜ = (n(t)− n˜) + p˜
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+ K˜ (p(t)− p˜)
Evaluate at time t = 0:
a(0)− a˜ = (n(0)− n˜) + p˜
(
K(0)− K˜
)
+ K˜ (p(0)− p˜)
Using the fact that a(0) = a0, K(0) = K0 and p(0)− p˜ = ω12B1, we get
a0 − a˜ = N1
µ1 − r?
(
K0 − K˜
)
+ p˜
(
K0 − K˜
)
+ K˜ω12
(
K0 − K˜
)
.
Assuming that the small open economy starts from an initial steady-state, such that a0 = a˜0
and K0 = K˜0
a˜0 − a˜ = N1
µ1 − r?
(
K˜0 − K˜
)
+ p˜0
(
K˜0 − K˜
)
+ K˜0ω12
(
K˜0 − K˜
)
B1.
Keeping in mind that x˜0 − x˜ = −dx˜, we obtain the long term change in the financial wealth:
da˜ =
[
N1
µ1 − r? + p˜0 + ω
1
2K˜0
]
dK˜,
with [
N1
µ1 − r? + p˜+ ω
1
2K˜
]
=
ω12
µ2
(
K˜µ2 − σcc˜N
)
< 0.
Differentiating (208) w.r.t, we get the dynamics of savings:
S(t) = a˙(t) = µ1
M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?
B1
dgT
dgT eµ1t > 0, (212a)
S(t) = a˙(t) = µ1
M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?
B1
dgN
dgNeµ1t < 0, (212b)
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where
B1
dgT
= − dK˜
dgT
> 0 and
B1
dgN
= − dK˜
dgN
< 0.
An Unanticipated Temporary Rise in Government Spending
We now evaluate the transitional dynamics of saving after an unanticipated temporary shock,
dgi (i = T,N).
kN > kT
Over the unstable period 1, saving evolves as follows:
S(t) = a˙(t) = r?
[
(a0 − a˜1)− M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?B1
]
er
?t + µ1
M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?B1e
µ1t, (213)
with
(a0 − a˜1) = (n0 − n˜1) + p˜0
(
K0 − K˜1
)
+K0 (p0 − p˜1) . (214)
Over the stable period 2, saving evolves as follows:
S(t) = a˙(t) = µ1
M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?B
′
1e
µ1t, (215)
To compute the long-term changes of financial wealth, we linearize its expression, i. e.
a(t) = n(t) + p(t)K(t) in the neighborhood of the final steady-state:
a(t)− a˜2 = (n(t)− n˜2) + p˜
(
K(t)− K˜2
)
+ K˜ (p(t)− p˜2)
Then we evaluate at time t = 0:
a0 − a˜2 = (n0 − n˜2) + p˜0
(
K0 − K˜2
)
+ K˜0 (p(0)− p˜2) ,
where we used the fact that a(0) = a0, n(0) = n0, K(0) = K0 and assumed that the small open
economy starts initially from the steady-state, i. e. a0 = a˜0 = a˜, n0 = n˜0 = n˜, K0 = K˜0 = K˜.
Substituting p(0)− p˜2 = ω12B1 into the expression above and differentiating w.r.t gi (i = T,N),
long-term changes of financial wealth are given by:
da˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= (vλ¯ + p˜Kλ¯)
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (216a)
da˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= (vλ¯ + p˜Kλ¯)
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (216b)
with
(vλ¯ + p˜Kλ¯) = −
σcpcc˜
λ¯r?
< 0. (217)
kT > kN
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Since ω12 = 0 whenever the traded good sector is relatively more capital intensive, and
because B2/dgi = 0, the transitional dynamics for saving degenerate and the financial wealth
jumps immediately to its new steady-state level.
Adopting a similar procedure than previously (i. e. in the case kN > kT ), we can calculate
the long-term changes of financial wealth as follows:
da˜
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= (vλ¯ + p˜Kλ¯)
dλ¯
dgT
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (218a)
da˜
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= (vλ¯ + p˜Kλ¯)
dλ¯
dgN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (218b)
with
vλ¯ + p˜Kλ¯ = −
σcpcc˜
λ¯r?
< 0. (219)
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